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Abstract 
The Nature of Compliance: 
Biodiversity Compensation under the Conservation Act 1987 
 
by 
Laurien Anne Heijs 
 
Biodiversity compensation is an increasingly popular policy tool that has the potential to balance 
conservation and development goals. It purports to enable continued development with the proviso 
that any residual effects of development on biodiversity are compensated for. Biodiversity 
compensation is controversial. Some argue that it is a useful policy instrument, whilst others consider 
it does little but facilitate inappropriate development and pacify those with an interest in protecting 
the environment. 
One issue that is considered detrimental to the use of biodiversity compensation as a policy tool, is 
inadequate monitoring and compliance. Non-compliance can mean failure to deliver the anticipated 
compensation and consequently can lead to biodiversity loss. This research project focused on 
compliance with biodiversity compensation on public conservation land in New Zealand, under the 
Conservation Act 1987. A mixed methods approach was used to investigate variations in, and 
predictors of, compliance. 
A total of 20 concession case studies from around the South Island of New Zealand, involving 28 
compensatory conditions, were assessed in this study. Results show that concessionaires complied 
with approximately two-thirds (68%) of biodiversity compensation conditions. This rate of 
compliance is similar to what was found under the New Zealand Resource Management Act 1991, 
and it is a vast improvement on overseas studies. Compliance was also observed to be non-uniform. 
Some variables, such as the duration of the compensatory action, had a statistically significant 
correlation with compliance. Other qualitative factors, observed during the data collection process, 
also had an effect on compliance. These include the ad hoc way in which compensation measures 
were implemented, monitored and enforced, as well as the Department of Conservation’s approach 
to compliance reporting and data management.  
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Continued research into this area is vital to ensure compensatory conditions lead to efficient and 
effective biodiversity management. This research has been important in providing the first insight 
into the use of, and compliance with, biodiversity compensation under the Conservation Act, and it 
paves the way for further exploration and discussion.  
Keywords: Biodiversity compensation, compliance, Conservation Act, concession, conditions, 
Department of Conservation (DOC), New Zealand, offset, monitoring.  
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“Here is your country. Cherish these natural wonders, cherish the natural resources, cherish the 
history and romance as a sacred heritage, for your children and your children's children. Do not let 
selfish men or greedy interests skin your country of its beauty, its riches or its romance.”  
 
― Theodore Roosevelt 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
New Zealanders have an extraordinary natural heritage. More than 8 million hectares of ancient 
native forests, spectacular mountain ranges, wide open tussock expanses, sweeping coastlines, 
cascading rivers, fertile wetlands, and tranquil lakes form New Zealand’s conservation estate – public 
conservation land managed by the Department of Conservation (DOC) under a mandate derived 
from the Conservation Act 1987 (hereon referred to as the Conservation Act). New Zealanders are 
the Kaitiaki, or guardians, of this land. The land is our birth right and our legacy.  
 
Unfortunately, New Zealand’s conservation estate is under threat. A rampant pest invasion, the 
effects of climate change, and habitat degradation and fragmentation are well-known culprits. This 
research, however, uncovers a lesser-known and until now unquantified threat, that of “broken 
promises.” These promises concern an increasingly popular policy mechanism called “biodiversity 
compensation.” The aim of biodiversity compensation is to counterbalance losses in biodiversity, as a 
result of residual, unavoidable impacts of development, with biodiversity conservation gains (Bull, 
Suttle, Gordon, Singh, & Milner-Gulland, 2013; Burgin, 2008; Gordon et al., 2011; Kiesecker, 
Copeland, Pocewicz, & McKenney, 2010; Maron et al., 2012; Overton, Stephens, & Ferrier, 2013; 
Pilgrim et al., 2013; Ten Kate, Bishop, & Bayon, 2004). The idea is that biodiversity compensation 
facilitates biodiversity accounting, and integrates biodiversity value and conservation into the 
consideration and cost-benefit analysis of development projects (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). 
 
Whilst there is support for the use of biodiversity compensation in New Zealand (Brown, Clarkson, 
Barton, & Joshi, 2014), the theory and practice are still considered controversial (Brown, Clarkson, 
Stephens, & Barton, 2014; Christensen & Barnes, 2009; Gillespie, 2012; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; 
Norton & Warburton, 2014; Walker, Brower, Stephens, & Lee, 2009). 
The focus of this research is on a major criticism of the concept, that of low levels of compliance or, 
“broken promises.” Low levels of compliance tend to be perpetuated by a general lack of post-
implementation compliance monitoring and enforcement (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Gibbons 
& Lindenmayer, 2007; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006; Race & Fonseca, 1996; 
Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). Without rigorous compliance monitoring, there is no way to know whether 
the biodiversity losses associated with development projects have been adequately compensated for 
(Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013).  
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This research provides the first insight into the use of, and compliance with, biodiversity 
compensation on New Zealand’s conservation estate. A mixed methods approach combined spatial, 
archival, and field ecology methods to assess: 
1. The levels of compliance with biodiversity compensation requirements in concessions 
granted under the Conservation Act.  
2. How variations in compliance might be explained.  
The hypothesis was that compliance with biodiversity compensation requirements is influenced by:  
- Conservation land category; 
- Habitat type; 
- Condition type; 
- Applicant type; 
- Activity type; and 
- A range of other variables within the concession application process, the concession contract 
and social circumstances surrounding the concession. 
This thesis is structured into six chapters. Following on from this chapter, Chapter 2 delves into the 
literature, providing a review of biodiversity compensation and then narrowing in on its application 
in New Zealand. Chapter 3 provides a description of the methods used in this study and chapter 4 
and 5 are the results and discussion. Chapter 4 and 5 expand on the variations in, and predictors of, 
compliance with biodiversity compensation. This detail should help DOC, and other regulatory 
agencies, to address instances of non-compliance in a more resource-effective manner. As such, the 
results of this study, and the conclusions and recommendations provided in chapter 6, should lead to 
more effective and efficient biodiversity management and facilitate a better understanding of the 
appropriate application and management of biodiversity compensation.  
This research adds to the growing global body of literature on biodiversity compensation and sheds 
light on the variations in, and predictors of, compliance. To date, evaluations of the use of 
biodiversity compensation in New Zealand have been limited. Whilst several authors have discussed 
its use within resource management, focusing typically on case studies or instances within case-law 
(Christensen, 2010; Department of Conservation, 2014b; Norton & Warburton, 2014; Rive, 2013), 
only Brown (2014) has done a systematic and empirical analysis. Brown’s (2014) research was on 
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ecological compensation under the Resource Management Act 1991. Within her research Brown 
(2014) identified the need for a similar study, which would look at biodiversity compensation on New 
Zealand’s public conservation estate, under the Conservation Act. This research addresses this 
knowledge gap and facilitates a future cross-policy comparison of biodiversity compensation 
between public and private land in New Zealand. As such, the layout of this research is similar to the 
layout of Part 1 (Ecological compensation: an evaluation of regulatory compliance in New Zealand) of 
Brown’s (2014) research.  
The ultimate question this research asks is whether any level of non-compliance, with biodiversity 
compensation on New Zealand’s public conservation estate, is acceptable. Non-compliance, or 
“broken promises,” represent failure to deliver the anticipated compensation, the result of which is 
an uncertain outcome for biodiversity. New Zealand is a global biodiversity hotspot (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2007), so it is important that the approach to 
biodiversity compensation is deliberated on, and potentially better regulated.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 The Biodiversity Crisis 
Our world is in the midst of a biodiversity crisis. Widespread consensus indicates that we are now 
experiencing a 6th mass extinction event (Barnosky et al., 2011; Novacek & Cleland, 2001). Novacek 
and Cleland (2001) characterise this mass extinction event by the unprecedented rate at which 
biodiversity is being lost and habitat degradation is occurring. Extinction rates are estimated to be 
several orders of magnitude higher than background rates (Cullen & White, 2013; Novacek & Cleland, 
2001). The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have determined that of 63,837 
species assessed for the IUCN Red list of 2012, 19,817 were threatened with extinction, including 
41% of amphibians, 33% of reef building corals, 30% of conifers, 25% of mammals and 13% of birds 
(International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2012). Barnosky et al. (2011) state that humans are 
the cause of this (the 6th) mass extinction event, through resource depletion, habitat loss, habitat 
fragmentation and degradation, the introduction of non-native species, hunting, the spreading of 
pathogens, and changes to global climate. Of these, habitat loss and the fragmentation and 
degradation of habitat are considered to be the primary drivers behind the extinction crisis (Balmford 
& Bond, 2005; Gillespie, 2012; Janetos et al., 2005).  
The international community has responded to the biodiversity crisis by setting targets, both 
nationally and internationally, to reduce the loss of biodiversity, increase the number of protected 
areas and restore any degraded habitat (Balmford & Bond, 2005; Gillespie, 2012). Unfortunately, 
these targets are not being met and impacts appear to be intensifying (Gillespie, 2012; Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010). Reasons for failure exist in escalating consumption 
patterns and the continued pursuit for economic growth by a growing and increasingly prosperous 
human population (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010). Consumption 
patterns are such that the world’s ecological footprint now exceeds the earth’s biological carrying 
capacity by more than 40% (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010).  
Our continued desire for development appears to be in direct conflict with the conservation of our 
biodiversity. Janetos et al. (2005) remind us that ecosystem services rely on interactions between 
elements of biodiversity. As humans we are wholly reliant on ecosystem services, which means we 
have an interest in halting the biodiversity crisis. As the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
(2005; cited in Brownlie, King, & Treweek, 2013, p. 25) describes it, biodiversity is “the life insurance 
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of life itself.” We thus need to learn to balance our growing resource needs and our development 
imperative with successful biodiversity conservation (Kiesecker et al., 2010). 
2.2 Biodiversity Compensation 
Biodiversity compensation is a tool that is used to strike a balance between development and 
biodiversity conservation. The purpose of biodiversity compensation is to enable continued 
development with the proviso that any residual effects of development projects on biodiversity are 
compensated for (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Burgin, 2008; Gordon et al., 2011; Kiesecker et al., 
2010; Maron et al., 2012; Overton et al., 2013; Pilgrim et al., 2013; Ten Kate et al., 2004). Biodiversity 
compensation has become increasingly popular in recent years (Curran, Hellweg, & Beck, 2014; 
Maron et al., 2012; Ten Kate et al., 2004), despite receiving widespread criticism in terms of its 
theoretical underpinnings and implementation record (Maron et al., 2012; McKenney & Kiesecker, 
2010; Walker et al., 2009). The concept of compensating for environmental harm has been around 
for a long time (Ten Kate et al., 2004). Under the rubric of tradable development rights, biodiversity 
compensation was first formalised in the United States (US) in the 1970s for wetland mitigation; the 
US water Resources Act of the 1970s required development-oriented wetland loss or degradation in 
one location to be offset by establishing equivalent wetlands elsewhere (Bull, Suttle, Singh, & Milner-
Gulland, 2013).  Biodiversity compensation is now being used all around the world (Burgin, 2008). 
Madsen, Becca, Carroll, Kandy, and Bennett (2011), in their 2011 update of offset and compensation 
programs worldwide, estimated that there were 45 existing programs globally, with another 27 in 
various stages of development. Wotherspoon and Burgin (2009) also noted a number of 
demonstration projects, or pilot case studies, occurring throughout the world.  
2.2.1 Goals of Biodiversity Compensation 
The main goal of biodiversity compensation is to counterbalance losses in biodiversity with 
biodiversity conservation gains (Maron et al., 2012).  McKenney and Kiesecker (2010), in a review of 
offset and compensation frameworks globally, found that policy goals ranged from general 
statements about the need to address adverse impacts to more rigorous goals of “no net loss” of 
biodiversity and potential “net gain.” Brazilian forest policy, for example, has an implied goal of no 
net loss of forest habitat by requiring private landholders to retain a defined minimum vegetative 
cover (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). Australia goes one step further in advocating for net 
environmental gains, where native vegetation regulations in New South Wales require that 
compensation measures improve or maintain environmental outcomes for particular environmental 
values (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). Goals of biodiversity compensation tend to be illustrated in 
country policies, but also in the performance standards of financial institutions like the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and multinational businesses such as Rio Tinto (Brownlie et al., 2013). The 
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specifics of these goals are complex and dominate a whole research area (Gordon et al., 2011; 
Matthews & Endress, 2008), with some authors (Walker et al., 2009) arguing that goals of “no net 
loss” or “net gain” are impossible to achieve.  
The goal of alleviating residual, unavoidable impacts of development projects on biodiversity 
(Gardner & Von Hase, 2012; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; Ten Kate et al., 2004) relies on biodiversity 
compensation being firmly anchored within the mitigation hierarchy (Kiesecker et al., 2010; Ten Kate 
et al., 2004). Projects must first avoid, remedy and mitigate biodiversity onsite, before considering 
compensation for residual impacts (Brownlie & Botha, 2009; Brownlie et al., 2013; Kiesecker et al., 
2010; Saenz et al., 2013; Ten Kate et al., 2004; Villarroya & Puig, 2010). Demonstrating this, is often 
mandatory as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process (Brownlie & Botha, 2009).  
Figure 1 illustrates the appropriate place of biodiversity compensation (here referred to as “offset”) 
within the mitigation hierarchy. Whether or not this goal of alleviating residual, unavoidable impacts 
of development can be successfully achieved, is debated in the literature (Bekessy et al., 2010; 
Quétier & Lavorel, 2011; Walker et al., 2009). There is a clear understanding however that there are 
limits to what can be compensated or “offset.”(Brownlie et al., 2013; International Council on Mining 
and Metals & International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2012; Pilgrim et al., 2013; The 
Biodiversity Consultancy, 2012). Biodiversity will continue to be lost to development pressure if these 
limits are not adhered to.  
 
Figure 1.  Biodiversity compensation or “offsetting” within the mitigation hierarchy (Gardner & Von 
Hase, 2012, p. 3). 
 15 
The Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) can be considered a source of biodiversity 
compensation and offsetting goals. BBOP is an international alliance of public, private and NGO 
sectors, which has laid out 10 fundamental principles for offsetting as well as guidelines for design 
and implementation (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012c). Figure 2 illustrates that if 
BBOP goals have been met, this suggests an “offset” form of compensation has been achieved. 
Otherwise the positive conservation action is just referred to as compensation.  
 
Figure 2. The compensation-offset spectrum (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012c, p. 
14). 
2.2.2 Defining Biodiversity Compensation 
The term “biodiversity” evolved from “biological diversity” which is defined by the CBD as "the 
variability among living organisms from all sources including terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are a part; this includes diversity within 
species, between species and of ecosystems” (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2005, p. 5). This is the definition for biodiversity that will be used throughout this study.  
Biodiversity compensation has multiple forms and labels such as: biodiversity offsets, ecological 
compensation, compensatory mitigation, environmental compensation or net conservation benefits 
(Gordon et al., 2011; Maron et al., 2012). The concept includes negotiated one-off exchanges, 
referred to as mitigation or compensation as well as “biodiversity offsets,” which are a more formal 
and quantitative form of biodiversity compensation. Defining terms in this topic area is difficult due 
to the variation between jurisdictions and amendments over time, which are a result of the 
progression of policy, case law and wider discourse (Briggs, Hill, & Gillespie, 2009; Brown, 2014; Ten 
Kate et al., 2004). However, all terms are used to describe, somewhat interchangeably, the same 
concept: of counterbalancing the adverse effects of development on biodiversity with positive 
biodiversity conservation measures (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). 
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 In New Zealand definitions are no less ambiguous. Local commentators believe this is serving as 
somewhat of a barrier to coherent discussion and implementation (Brown, Clarkson, Barton, et al., 
2014; Christensen, 2007; Memon, Skelton, & Borrie, 2004; Rive, 2013). Whilst internationally the 
most commonly cited term is “biodiversity offsetting,” this is not appropriate for the context of this 
study as “offsetting” includes goals which are not part of New Zealand’s legal system (Brown, 
Clarkson, Barton, & Joshi, 2013). Observation of the mitigation hierarchy (explained in Section 2.2.1.), 
for example, often occurs in practice yet it is not a legal requirement in New Zealand (Brown et al., 
2013). “No net loss”, which is an explicit objective of biodiversity offsetting, is also not part of New 
Zealand legislation (even though it is referred to occasionally in case law) (Brown et al., 2013).  
The term “compensation” is somewhat broader than “offsetting” and is more appropriate for the 
New Zealand context. Compensation refers to the act of compensating, to give something as 
recompense for any harm, damage or loss (Voogd, 2009). In New Zealand the term “environmental 
compensation” is what is commonly denoted in the Courts (Christensen & Barnes, 2009). 
Environmental compensation however, refers to a much broader range of environmental and 
amenity values which are not specifically biodiversity related (Christensen & Barnes, 2009). As most 
of the international literature focuses specifically on biodiversity values, the term that will be used in 
this study is “biodiversity compensation.” For the purpose of this study the definition of biodiversity 
compensation is: 
“Positive conservation actions, intended to compensate for the residual adverse effects of 
development and resource use” 
2.2.3 Types of Biodiversity Compensation 
There are various approaches to biodiversity compensation: regulatory, voluntary, market-based, ad 
hoc, or hybrid (Ten Kate et al., 2004).  Regulatory biodiversity compensation is becoming increasingly 
popular (Madsen et al., 2011). Countries with regulatory biodiversity compensation programmes 
include Australia, Canada, the European Union, South Africa, Brazil and the United States (Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Morris, Alonso, Jefferson, & Kirby, 2006). In Canada, for example, the Canadian 
Fisheries Act 1985 regulates for no net loss in fisheries habitat, with government guidelines 
specifying legal requirements for compensation measures (Ten Kate et al., 2004).  
Voluntary biodiversity compensation is gradually becoming more common (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et 
al., 2013), with Madsen, Carroll, and Moore Brands (2010) revealing a modest but growing number of 
corporate volunteer initiatives. In most cases voluntary biodiversity compensation is initiated on an 
ad hoc basis, driven by business interest or personal enthusiasm of staff members at a site (Maron et 
al., 2012). Voluntary biodiversity compensation then includes a significant amount of negotiation 
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between stakeholders to arrive at a solution that is socially acceptable (Brown, 2014). Corporations 
such as Rio Tinto, choose to undertake voluntary biodiversity compensation in order to implement 
their own environmental or sustainable development policies (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010), and 
also simply because it is good for business (Ten Kate et al., 2004). Debate exists on whether voluntary 
biodiversity compensation measures alone can be relied upon to meet conservation goals or whether 
voluntary biodiversity compensation is just in anticipation of a forthcoming regulatory regime 
(Burgin, 2008; Maron et al., 2012; Ten Kate et al., 2004). 
In addition to regulatory and voluntary biodiversity compensation, market-based biodiversity 
compensation has also been proliferating globally, with countries such as the US setting up credit 
markets for trades in biodiversity value (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). These market-based 
strategies are promoted as neoliberal governance solutions to dealing with biodiversity loss 
(Pawliczek & Sullivan, 2011). They aim to internalise negative ecological externalities into the costs of 
development projects (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013), and rely heavily on the monetisation of 
biodiversity through quantitative metrics and ratios (Reid, 2012). This idea of attaching a value to 
biodiversity is central to the Environmental Economics discipline (Nunes & van den Bergh, 2001; 
Polasky, Costello, & Solow, 2005), where a key discernment is that when a commodity has no price it 
is perceived of as free (Edwards & Abivardi, 1998). Monetising biodiversity is thus seen as a 
necessary way of ensuring that damage to biodiversity, as a result of development projects, is not 
ignored (Edwards & Abivardi, 1998; Reid, 2012). Market-based approaches to biodiversity 
compensation have, however, been significantly critiqued (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Reid, 
2012; Salzman & Ruhl, 2000; Walker et al., 2009). One concern is that using a market approach 
entails a commodification of nature, where some elements of value are not wholly captured (Reid, 
2012; Walker et al., 2009). Another concern is that, although market-mechanisms may allow for 
more actors to take initiative in protecting biodiversity (compared to regulatory systems), they may 
also reduce public accountability as compensation measures now exist as private agreements (Reid, 
2012).  
A combination of all of these approaches is being used globally, with each approach to biodiversity 
compensation characterised by different goals, structures and methods of implementation and each 
accompanied by its own opportunities and challenges.  
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2.3 The Promise of Biodiversity Compensation 
The purpose of biodiversity compensation, to balance development and conservation goals, is its 
main temptation. Numerous authors have detailed the benefits and opportunities offered by 
biodiversity compensation (Bedward, Ellis, & Simpson, 2009; Burgin, 2008; Gillespie, 2012; Quintero 
& Mathur, 2011; Ten Kate et al., 2004). They describe biodiversity compensation as a useful policy 
instrument (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007), one that suits existing legal frameworks and has the 
potential to advance biodiversity conservation goals (Gillespie, 2012).The attraction of the concept 
can really be seen, however, through the proliferation of biodiversity compensation programs 
worldwide (Madsen et al., 2011). In this section the promise of biodiversity compensation will be 
discussed in terms of the benefits to stakeholders and to environmental management.  
2.3.1 Stakeholder Benefits 
Research by Ten Kate et al. (2004) suggests biodiversity compensation provides a wide array of 
benefits to various stakeholders. For businesses, biodiversity compensation can strengthen a 
company’s ability to operate by securing support from regulatory organisations, local communities, 
and non-governmental organisations (Ten Kate et al., 2004). Biodiversity compensation is receiving 
widespread interest from businesses for this reason (Burgin, 2008; Ten Kate et al., 2004; Virah-
Sawmy, Ebeling, & Taplin, 2014). Biodiversity compensation can also create new markets, create 
regulatory good-will (thus speeding up the permit process and saving businesses time and money), 
lower costs of compliance, lead to employee satisfaction, create access to capital, help businesses 
meet performance standards and demonstrate good environmental stewardship, as well as allow 
businesses to manage regulatory risk (Saenz et al., 2013; Ten Kate et al., 2004; Virah-Sawmy et al., 
2014).  
For regulatory authorities, biodiversity compensation presents a way to balance development and 
conservation imperatives. Regulatory authorities can use biodiversity compensation to make 
progress towards conservation goals at a range of spatial scales, whilst also enabling them to support 
development projects (Bedward et al., 2009; Burgin, 2008; Ten Kate et al., 2004). Biodiversity 
compensation involves a more collaborative decision-making process (as opposed to a yes or no 
decision), which allows regulatory authorities to maintain a good working relationship with all 
stakeholders (Ten Kate et al., 2004). Another benefit for regulatory authorities is that biodiversity 
compensation can draw funds towards conservation, an area that is often struggling in resources 
(Burgin, 2008; Kiesecker et al., 2010; Quintero & Mathur, 2011; Ten Kate et al., 2004).  
Conservation groups can use and influence biodiversity compensation to secure more and better 
conservation outcomes and obtain extra funding for conservation projects (Ten Kate et al., 2004). For 
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instance, they can push for biodiversity compensation to be integrated into landscape-level planning; 
thus moving conservation practice beyond piecemeal mitigation towards the creation of wider 
conservation gains (Kiesecker et al., 2010; Saenz et al., 2013). Furthermore, biodiversity 
compensation can be a tool for ensuring that regional conservation goals are integrated into 
government and business planning (Saenz et al., 2013).  
For local communities, Ten Kate et al. (2004) suggests that biodiversity compensation includes a 
collaborative decision making process, which means communities are kept involved and decision 
outcomes are more likely to be socially acceptable. Biodiversity compensation also provides 
communities with a way of ensuring functional and productive ecosystems during and after 
development projects (Ten Kate et al., 2004).  It can ensure that developers not only rehabilitate 
project sites, but also provide for additional conservation gains for the community; gains that can 
support livelihoods and provide amenity (Ten Kate et al., 2004).  
2.3.2 Environmental Management 
Biodiversity compensation is perceived as an attractive tool in environmental management as it 
negotiates and integrates the needs of multiple stakeholders (Pilgrim et al., 2013; Ten Kate et al., 
2004). Through this process, biodiversity compensation seeks to avoid costly and politically 
challenging arguments that would be the result of attempting to put bans on further development, 
whilst also striving for biodiversity conservation goals and maintaining natural capital (Bedward et al., 
2009; Overton et al., 2013). Biodiversity compensation’s biggest attraction is that it can mobilise 
large funds for conservation (Kiesecker et al., 2010). Funds would be created on a developer-pays 
basis, taking pressure off public funds and allowing for fair considerations of liability (Bedward et al., 
2009; Gillespie, 2012). Gillespie (2012) states that biodiversity compensation would also be an 
improvement on traditional environmental management as it introduces the idea of boundaries, 
“red-flags,” to development; measures of irreplaceability that should not be transgressed.  
There is an opinion within the literature that, when biodiversity compensation is viewed with a 
degree of flexibility and comprehensive planning of conservation goals, it can lead to conservation 
benefits that would otherwise be unachievable (Gillespie, 2012; Norton & Warburton, 2014; 
Quintero & Mathur, 2011). One source goes so far as to say that biodiversity compensation has the 
potential to result in increased accountability, rigour, and transparency in relation to monitoring and 
compliance, decreased financial risk to regulatory authorities and consent applicants, potential for 
improved stakeholder relationships, better environmental outcomes through accountability and 
process improvements, further incentives for the development and continued improvement of 
supporting systems  (reporting systems and integrated regional and national State of the 
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Environment monitoring programmes and databases), and the setting of national or regional targets 
for the protection of indigenous species and habitats (Tonkin and Taylor, 2012).  
2.4 The Peril of Biodiversity Compensation 
Although biodiversity compensation, as a practice area, is growing rapidly, the field is riddled with 
complications (Brownlie et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2012; Walker et al., 2009). According to Harper 
and Quigley (2005) habitat compensation, as currently implemented in Canada, is slowing down but 
not stopping the rate of habitat loss, and according to Walker et al. (2009), biodiversity 
compensation in the form of “offsets” have facilitated development and increased biodiversity loss. 
In this section the limitations of biodiversity compensation will be discussed in terms of technical 
issues with the concept, issues of fairness and governance, issues of risk and uncertainty, and issues 
of monitoring and compliance. The latter issue is the focus of this research.  
2.4.1 Technical Issues 
If biodiversity compensation is going to mitigate the biodiversity crisis, there are several challenges it 
must first overcome. Technical issues, which some see as impassable barriers (Walker et al., 2009) 
and others as mere hurdles to overcome (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; Moilanen, 2013; Moilanen, 
van Teeffelen, Ben-Haim, & Ferrier, 2009; Norton, 2009; Pilgrim et al., 2013), represent one such 
challenge. The literature on biodiversity compensation is riddled with technical issues, yet common 
ones appear to be: issues of equivalence, biodiversity accounting, additionality, and the setting of 
appropriate thresholds.  
Equivalence 
Ecological equivalence is frequently noted in the literature as being a requisite of biodiversity 
compensation (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011; Ten Kate et al., 2004). Equivalence can be broken down into 
equivalence in type, space, and time (Brown, 2014; Race & Fonseca, 1996).  
Equivalence in type is often worded as a requirement for biodiversity compensation, particularly in 
the form of “offsets,” to be “like-for-like” or “in-kind” (Ten Kate et al., 2004). This means that damage 
to a particular habitat would require the protection or creation of a similar habitat with the same 
specific elements of biodiversity (Reid, 2012). This is a requirement that is especially important and 
contentious for elements of biodiversity considered to be irreplaceable (Reid, 2012). Although this 
requirement for type-equivalence is easier for the public to understand and for conservationists to 
measure (Ten Kate et al., 2004), it is underpinned by the belief that restoration ecologists can restore 
or recreate ecosystems (Maron et al., 2012). Given the complexity and variability of natural systems, 
and the relatively young discipline of restoration ecology, there is increasing recognition that this 
may be impossible, especially within any reasonable time-frame (Curran et al., 2014; Hobbs, Hallett, 
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Ehrlich, & Mooney, 2011; Morris et al., 2006). Maron et al. (2012) believe that through this 
requirement, biodiversity offsets in particular push the limits of both scientific knowledge and 
practical feasibility. Habib, Farr, Schneider, and Boutin (2013) counter this with a suggestion that: 
more flexible, “out-of-kind” compensation measures, although perhaps more difficult to measure, 
may allow for damage to one habitat type to be balanced by support of a quite different, yet equally 
(or more) valuable habitat type, which may better support regional conservation priorities. Norton 
and Warburton (2014), for instance, make the suggestion that invasive species control could be an 
appropriate “out-of-kind” offset applicable to the New Zealand biodiversity management context. 
“Out-of-kind” offsets are gradually becoming more acceptable (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010), 
despite ecological equivalence still being quite difficult to prove (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). 
There is little support, however, for very out-of-kind offsets such as funding for conservation training 
and education (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010).  
Equivalence in space refers to the distance of the compensation measure or offset from the site 
impacted. Research by Ten Kate et al. (2004) shows that, from a public perspective, distance matters. 
The closer the compensation measure is to the impact site the more socially acceptable it is, as local 
communities can see the benefits, otherwise you could end up with a reverse-NIMBY (not-in-my-
backyard), where locals loose out (Ten Kate et al., 2004). Onsite compensation also has the greatest 
potential to minimise the disruption to remaining biodiversity and ecological functions (Race & 
Fonseca, 1996). There are many biodiversity compensation programmes and policies around the 
world that limit the distance of compensation activities for these reasons (Gordon et al., 2011).  A 
limitation to maintaining equivalence in space, however, is that it restricts compensation to (or close 
to) the impact site, thus creating often highly fragmented and isolated habitats that may not be able 
to ensure long-lasting conservation benefits (Ten Kate et al., 2004). A more flexible approach of 
compensating at distant sites, is thus often advocated for (Habib et al., 2013; Underwood, 2011), and 
becoming increasingly common (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). This landscape level approach is 
often recommended as a more efficient and effective use of conservation funds (Naidoo et al., 2006) 
and can lead to larger, more consolidated conservation areas (Ten Kate et al., 2004). Overall, 
equivalence in space is an issue of divergent opinion, which is still receiving much attention.  
Lastly, equivalence in time is widely cited as a requisite for biodiversity compensation, as any time-
lag between the loss of biodiversity and the delivery of the compensation measure can have 
significant ecological implications (Bekessy et al., 2010; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 
2012). Gordon et al. (2011) show that equivalence in time is in fact a critical determinant of success, 
outweighing the importance of spatial proximity. Maintaining and demonstrating time equivalence 
is, however, proving a major challenge (Bekessy et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2011). The literature is full 
of attempts to deal with the issue of time equivalency (Bekessy et al., 2010; Carpenter, Brock, & 
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Ludwig, 2007; Moilanen et al., 2009; Overton et al., 2013), yet it continues to be an issue of debate, 
affecting the viability of biodiversity compensation (Maron et al., 2012). 
Biodiversity Accounting 
Measuring ecological equivalence, or the more rigorous goal of no net loss, requires consideration of 
biodiversity value (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Reid, 2012). Simplified metrics, encapsulating 
multiple values and time differences, are increasingly being employed in order to measure 
biodiversity value and weigh up biodiversity losses against biodiversity gains (Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 2012). Some authors (Habib et al., 2013; Reid, 2012; Salzman & 
Ruhl, 2000) advocate for such metrics, emphasising their benefits in terms of balancing scientific 
detail and ease of measurement and for keeping transaction costs low and adoption simple. 
However, there is a lot of evidence in the literature that these simplified metrics are limiting and lead 
to a failure in terms of equivalence; losses or gains in individual components can be masked by the 
single value of the metric, the metric could exclude important values such as ecosystem function, or 
the metric may not accurately account for uncertainty over time (Maron et al., 2012; Palmer & 
Filoso, 2009; Walker et al., 2009). Addressing this limitation requires improved methods for 
measuring biodiversity value (Maron et al., 2012). This is an area receiving increased research 
attention (Bruggeman, Jones, Scribner, & Lupi, 2009; Carpenter et al., 2007; Maron et al., 2012; 
McCarthy et al., 2004; Overton et al., 2013), however, Maron et al. (2012) states that fundamental 
problems still remain.  
Aside from methodology issues involved with establishing successful biodiversity compensation, 
there is also a dilemma of whether biodiversity could and should, be traded at all. Walker et al. 
(2009) express that viable trading requires simple and easily measurable and interchangeable 
commodities, traits that are seldom found when it comes to biodiversity. There is thus the threat 
that, whilst simple individual elements of biodiversity might be compensated for, more complex or 
process-oriented elements could be lost (Burgin, 2008). Walker et al. (2009) suggest that, for this 
reason the concept is fundamentally flawed and unworkable and that whilst some authors propose 
fixes, the overall trading of biodiversity will result in poorer biodiversity outcomes than traditional 
approaches (policies, rules and prohibitions) (Walker et al., 2009).  
Additionality 
Additionality denotes that biodiversity compensation actions are new contributions to conservation 
and would not have occurred under the status quo (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; Reid, 2012). 
Additionality is articulated in the 5th principle of the BBOP (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme, 2012c) and is a key consideration of most biodiversity compensation frameworks. In the 
US for example,  guidance for conservation banking states, that “land used to establish conservation 
 23 
banks must not be previously designated for conservation purposes (e.g. parks, green spaces, 
municipal watershed lands)” (US Department of the Interior, 2003, p. 6).  
The difficulty with additionality is reliably forecasting the future, status-quo, level of management 
(Maron et al., 2012; Reid, 2012). Doubts are expressed about the methodologies used and their 
effectiveness in assessing additionality (Reid, 2012). Some types of biodiversity compensation are at 
particular risk of not abiding by additionality requirements. Market-based approaches, such as 
biodiversity banks, risk eroding additionality requirements as restoration actions that would have 
been done outside of biodiversity markets, can be used to generate biodiversity credits (Maron et al., 
2012). Ways of dealing with additionality focus mostly on the creation of new projects (Ten Kate et 
al., 2004). Some authors, however, believe that biodiversity compensation which supports existing 
projects leads to a higher chance of success, as long as background rates of habitat and biodiversity 
loss are demonstrably high and no strong protection measures are yet in place (Bull, Gordon, Law, 
Suttle, & Milner-Gulland, 2014; Curran et al., 2014; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 
2012; Norton, 2007; Ten Kate et al., 2004).  In the end, the level of additionality is subject to the 
current level of management and protection of the habitat (at a range of scales), and the inherent 
vulnerability of that habitat type (Brown, 2014). It is imperative that issues with assessing 
additionality are addressed, because otherwise the result of any biodiversity compensation will be a 
net loss in biodiversity (International Council on Mining and Metals & International Union for 
Conservation of Nature, 2012). To this end, it is worth noting Walker et al. (2009), who question 
whether the issue is addressable at all.  
Thresholds 
Defining appropriate thresholds is critical to ensuring biodiversity compensation does not result in 
inappropriate trade-offs (Brownlie et al., 2013; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012b; 
The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2012). Some impacts of development are so large they simply cannot 
be compensated for, either in a sufficiently equivalent (i.e. no net loss) or a socially acceptable way 
(International Council on Mining and Metals & International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2012). 
Species extinction is the most commonly cited example of an impact that cannot be compensated for 
(International Council on Mining and Metals & International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2012). 
Thresholds, “red-flags,” for what can be manageably offset or compensated for tend to reflect levels 
of biodiversity loss that are unacceptable to society (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Pilgrim et al., 
2013). Decisions are made based on the reversibility of the change, the risk in achieving the 
compensation measure, the irreplaceability, vulnerability and substitutability of biodiversity 
elements affected, as well as how society depends on and perceives, these elements of biodiversity 
(Brownlie et al., 2013; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012b). Thresholds are then 
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ideally defined in regional or national conservation plans, strategies or policies (International Council 
on Mining and Metals & International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2012; Pilgrim et al., 2013).  
Within the literature there are some examples of policy guidance documents which define upper 
limits for biodiversity compensation (International Finance Corporation, 2012), and of decision 
frameworks for developers and regulators to identify limits to offsetting (Business and Biodiversity 
Offsets Programme, 2012b; Pilgrim et al., 2013; The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2012). The 2nd 
principle of the BBOP, for instance, is about limits to offsetting (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme, 2012c). What defines an appropriate threshold and how this is decided and 
implemented, is still considered a contentious issue (International Council on Mining and Metals & 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2012). Some authors, for example, criticise the 
decision-making process, stating that thresholds seem to be based more on political decisions than 
on scientific evidence (Matcham, 2012). Ultimately, the value of any policies or guidance documents 
on this subject depends on their integration with existing national-level biodiversity policies and 
plans, which detail conservation goals and seek to address cumulative impacts (Pilgrim et al., 2013).  
Biodiversity loss will continue to occur if appropriate limits to biodiversity compensation, and 
especially “offsetting,” are not rigorously implemented (The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2012).  
2.4.2 Issues of Fairness and Governance 
Despite the array of methodologies and decision-support tools, either existing or in development, the 
decision of what determines a fair and acceptable compensation measure or offset is a social one. So 
who determines what compensation measure is both fair and acceptable? Several authors suggest 
this decision is tipped towards development interests, who represent the motivated few against the 
disorganised many (Matcham, 2012; Salzman & Ruhl, 2000; Walker et al., 2009), with Walker et al. 
(2009) stating that public choice theory predicts this. 
When it comes to responsibility for biodiversity compensation, regulatory authorities tend to be 
perceived as the key decision makers, even with voluntary compensation measures (Ten Kate et al., 
2004). Often consensus between stakeholders will not be easy to achieve, and regulatory authorities 
are given the role of the arbiter as they are eventually responsible for granting the licenses for 
development projects (Ten Kate et al., 2004). For biodiversity compensation measures to be fair, 
conservation priorities must be clearly laid out and communicated by regulatory authorities, through 
appropriate law and policy and through case-by-case negotiations. The issue that Walker et al. (2009) 
and Matcham (2012) put forward is that regulatory authorities are often forced into making efficient 
and speedy decisions, favouring the “yes with conditions” approach over the “no” which can result in 
an expensive court battle. Incentives for officials also frequently align with development interests. 
Winter (1985) even proposes that regulatory authorities often neglect to fund full enforcement, and 
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that officials are sometimes actively discouraged from frustrating powerful vested interests. In the 
end, biodiversity compensation appears to be more of a political process than a technical and 
scientific act (Voogd, 2009).  
The unfortunate outcome of this perceived bartering process for biodiversity compensation is that 
the playing field is typically tipped towards development interests (Walker et al., 2009).  Biodiversity 
protection interests have only a limited capability to engage in a bartering process, often due to a 
lack of funds, and rely on regulatory authorities to uphold robust exchange measures (Walker et al., 
2009). Unfortunately, political theory predicts that, in trading biodiversity, officials are likely to relax 
safeguards and facilitate trading at the expense of biodiversity (Walker et al., 2009). The result  is 
that developers gain the upper-hand and that, unless developers have their own stringent 
biodiversity protection goals, biodiversity compensation agreements will be so watered down they 
are essentially useless at protecting biodiversity.  
2.4.3 Issues of Risk and Uncertainty 
Biodiversity compensation is riddled with risk and uncertainty. This is due to the complexity of 
biodiversity as well as the relatively young and undeveloped science in this field (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, 
et al., 2013; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012a). It seems impossible to prove, in 
practical terms, that the more rigorous goal of no net loss (or net gain) of biodiversity can be 
achieved through biodiversity compensation and many projects appear likely to fall short of this goal 
(Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012a).  
Compensation measures often involve certain biodiversity losses for uncertain gains (Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012a; Maron et al., 2012). Furthermore, according to Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (2012a), these losses and gains will always, irrespective of the quality 
of baseline data available, be at some level biologically dissimilar.  
Another layer of uncertainty is added by the dynamic nature of the environment. Changing 
conditions, including the effects of climate change, can alter species population sizes and their 
preferred distributions (Harris, Hobbs, Higgs, & Aronson, 2006; Reid, 2012; Tal, 2014). The idea, 
therefore, of identifying new sites for biodiversity compensation becomes challenging, and even 
more so when taking into account the long time it takes to restore or recreate a habitat (Maron et 
al., 2012; Reid, 2012). Reid (2012), however, believes that biodiversity compensation could actually 
play a valuable role in providing for the new or enhanced areas of habitat that species will need as 
they are forced to adapt to changing climatic conditions. This belief is supported by an increasing 
confidence in the literature about the responses of natural systems to climatic changes (Parmesan & 
Yohe, 2003; Walther et al., 2002).  
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In the end, areas of uncertainty and risk need to be carefully considered (Business and Biodiversity 
Offsets Programme, 2012a). So far, there is no refined framework for the treatment of uncertainty 
(Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). Proposed frameworks for incorporating risk, such as the RobOff 
software (Pouzols, Moilanen, & Isaac, 2013) and the frameworks put forth by Gardner et al. (2013) 
and Moilanen et al. (2009), have begun to address this. Common approaches to dealing with risk and 
uncertainty have focused on the use of multipliers. Multipliers increase the amount of biodiversity 
gain required, to account for uncertainty in biodiversity loss and the success of the compensation 
measure itself (Bull, Suttle, Singh, et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2012; Moilanen et al., 2009). A study 
done by  Moilanen et al. (2009), however, on the level at which a multiplier provides a guaranteed 
favourable outcome, found that very large multipliers would be needed to comprehensively account 
for uncertainty, and that these would likely be considered politically and economically unacceptable.  
Advice for addressing issues of uncertainty and risk revolves around strengthening these exchange 
rules and regulating rigorous adherence to the mitigation hierarchy and to the BBOP principles 
(Gardner et al., 2013). Several authors also note the importance of a precautionary approach, one 
that is accompanied by long-term monitoring and funding (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme, 2012a; Gardner et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2012). Monitoring and funding will help 
guarantee biodiversity compensation projects are protected in their longevity, ensuring no temporal 
losses in conservation value (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). Walker et al. (2009) however state that 
regardless of any of these proposed fixes the concept of biodiversity trading is inherently flawed.  
Active adaptive management, where dual objectives of learning and conservation are set at the 
outset can further help address issues of risk and uncertainty (Gardner et al., 2013; McKenney & 
Kiesecker, 2010). According to Maron et al. (2012), most restoration projects today simply implement 
current best-practice, with no experimentation and monitoring of alternative strategies, and 
monitoring only until failure or more fashionable options emerge. Gibbons and Lindenmayer (2007) 
state that management of biodiversity compensation projects must be flexible enough to allow for 
some change if outcomes are not being achieved. Lastly, there is a clear need also to support more 
research in the field of restoration ecology as biodiversity compensation policies raise the stakes for 
restoration projects (Maron et al., 2012).  
2.4.4 Monitoring and Compliance issues 
The success of biodiversity compensation projects ultimately relies on adequate monitoring and 
compliance (Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). Non-compliance is the failure to deliver the anticipated 
compensation and thus the result is an uncertain outcome for biodiversity. International experience 
shows a severe lack of post-implementation evaluation in the field of conservation (Ferraro & 
Pattanayak, 2006). Reviews of biodiversity compensation indicate low levels of compliance 
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accompanied by low enforcement rates; with failures to adequately monitor and enforce 
perpetuating low levels of compliance (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 
2007; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006; Race & Fonseca, 1996; Tonkin and Taylor, 
2012). Mitigation banking, in the US and Canada for example, has been affected by high levels of 
non-compliance with permit conditions (Harper & Quigley, 2005; Race & Fonseca, 1996). In Canada, 
Harper and Quigley (2005) have determined that compensation conditions were followed in only 17 
of 124 developments affecting fish habitat. Low levels of monitoring may have exacerbated this, and 
have led to further unknown or unsuccessful biodiversity compensation project outcomes (Bull, 
Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). In addition to this, biodiversity compensation projects in Canada were 
only monitored for an average of 3.7 years post construction (Harper & Quigley, 2005).   
The main reasons for poor monitoring and compliance with respect to biodiversity compensation 
include: an absence of a regulatory framework that adequately provides for biodiversity 
compensation; a lack of, and motivation for providing, resources and funds for monitoring; confusion 
about the burden of proof (who is responsible for monitoring); an absence of guidelines, standards 
and training in the field of biodiversity compensation monitoring, and; technical difficulties involved 
with measuring biodiversity (Matthews & Endress, 2008; Rega, 2013; Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). 
Principle 8 of the BBOP recognises these difficulties and attempts to address them with a series of 
criteria and indicators (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2012c).  
Many authors suggest more information is needed on the outcomes of biodiversity compensation 
projects, as even though compensation projects might comply with permit conditions, there is no 
surety on whether biodiversity outcomes are being met (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Matthews 
& Endress, 2008; Quintero & Mathur, 2011). Measuring the outcomes of biodiversity compensation 
projects is complicated by the difficulties in measuring biodiversity value and the lack of a 
comprehensive biodiversity currency (see Section 2.4.1“Biodiversity Accounting”) (Bull, Suttle, 
Gordon, et al., 2013). Some parties might also evaluate project success quite differently, depending 
on their motivation and the methodologies and analytical techniques they use (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, 
et al., 2013). 
In the end, rigorous post-implementation monitoring and enforcement of compliance is the only way 
to ensure biodiversity losses have been balanced by biodiversity gains (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 
2013). Monitoring should enable adaptive management, allowing the biodiversity compensation 
process to be continually improved (Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al. (2013) 
suggest that a publicly available global register of the outcomes of biodiversity compensation 
projects would aid our understanding of their long-term effectiveness. Independent review is also 
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encouraged, to enable quality assurance on the scientific accuracy and sufficiency of any biodiversity 
compensation measures (Brownlie et al., 2013).  
2.5 The New Zealand Context 
In New Zealand, biodiversity compensation is increasingly being looked to as a policy tool for 
addressing biodiversity decline (Brown, Clarkson, Barton, et al., 2014; Denny, 2011; Madsen et al., 
2011). This section will describe the New Zealand biodiversity crisis and current biodiversity policy. 
This will be followed by a close-up examination of biodiversity compensation in practice in New 
Zealand.  
2.5.1 The New Zealand Biodiversity Crisis 
New Zealand is an isolated archipelago in the south-western Pacific, whose evolutionary history 
diverged markedly from the rest of the world’s around 65-80 million years ago, when it separated 
from the southern continent of Gondwanaland (Cooper & Millener, 1993; Craig et al., 2000; 
Schneider & Samkin, 2012). New Zealand’s long geographic isolation means the country is home to a 
distinct range of indigenous flora and fauna (Anon, 2000). High levels of endemism (endemic species 
make up 80-100% of most groups), unusual forms (e.g. flightlessness), and many missing functional 
groups (most notably mammals) are common characteristics amongst New Zealand’s biota (Lee, 
McGlone, & Wright, 2005). These characteristics make New Zealand’s biota especially vulnerable to 
change (Anon, 2000).  
New Zealand was the last large land mass to be occupied by humans (Anon, 2000; Craig et al., 2000). 
Polynesian ancestors of the modern Maori arrived in New Zealand some 700-1000 years ago and 
Europeans arrived about 200 years ago (Craig et al., 2000). Since colonisation, New Zealand’s 
landscape has undergone significant changes (Craig et al., 2000). These changes were enough to 
cause New Zealand to have one of the world’s worst records of indigenous biodiversity loss (Anon, 
2000). At least 32% of indigenous land and freshwater birds are now extinct, 18% of seabirds are 
extinct, 3 out of 7 frogs, at least 12 invertebrates, 1 fish, 1 bat, up to 3 reptiles and approximately 11 
plants are also extinct (Anon, 2000). Many species of plant and animal continue to be threatened 
today, or data is insufficient to determine their status (Anon, 2000).  
The main causal factors behind this ongoing biodiversity loss are habitat destruction, habitat 
fragmentation and degradation, and the introduction of non-native species (Balmford & Bond, 2005; 
Craig et al., 2000; Norton & Warburton, 2014; Saunders & Norton, 2001). To date, approximately 
63% of New Zealand’s land-area has been converted into farms, exotic forests, settlements and 
roads, turning a once continuous range of distinctive ecosystems into a patchwork quilt of isolated 
fragments (Anon, 2000; Walker, Price, Rutledge, Stephens, & Lee, 2006). The issue with these 
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fragments is that most of them are found in steeper, unproductive, mountainous areas, areas that 
have been allocated to New Zealand’s conservation estate mostly due to reasons of aesthetic appeal 
(Anon, 2000; Green, 2006; Norton & Overmars, 2012; Walker, Price, & Rutledge, 2008). There is thus 
a lack of habitat for indigenous biodiversity in the lowlands, in river margins, wetlands, dunelands 
and in coastal areas (Anon, 2000; Craig et al., 2000; Norton & Miller, 2000; Norton & Overmars, 
2012), and ecosystem functions are being compromised (Green, 2006). Aside from this, there is the 
threat of non-native species. Invasive (non-native) species smother, compete with, or prey on native 
species and are arguably the single biggest threat to New Zealand’s indigenous biodiversity (Craig et 
al., 2000; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2011). Biota have suffered range 
contractions and extinction and ecosystems have undergone pronounced changes in structure and 
composition as a result of invasive species (Saunders & Norton, 2001). The impact of introduced 
species has been so catastrophic that some authors have described the result as an “ecological 
collapse” (Towns and Atkinson, 1991; cited in Saunders & Norton, 2001). 
2.5.2 New Zealand Biodiversity Policy 
New Zealand is recognised as a global biodiversity hotspot. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (2007, p. 5) has noted that “New Zealand has a special 
responsibility for biodiversity conservation, since a high percentage of its 90,000 native species are 
endemic and unique.” On a national level New Zealand’s biodiversity is part of the nation’s sense of 
identity, the health and well-being of the population, and it underpins the country’s economy 
(Norton & Cochrane, 2000; Schneider & Samkin, 2012). In 1994, the annual value of New Zealand’s 
indigenous biodiversity was estimated by economists to be $230 billion, almost three times the GDP 
for the same year (Patterson and Cole, 1999; cited in Schneider & Samkin, 2012). The value of New 
Zealand’s biodiversity is recognised through a range of legislative instruments. 
Figure 3 illustrates the legislation which underpins biodiversity conservation, management, and use 
on public and private land in New Zealand. This legislation is noted to be both fragmented and 
complex (Schneider & Samkin, 2012).  
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 Figure 3.  Legislation relating to the protection of New Zealand's biodiversity (Schneider & Samkin, 
2012, p. 15). 
The Conservation Act 1987 and the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) are New Zealand’s 
leading pieces of biodiversity-related legislation. The Conservation Act is administered by the 
Department of Conservation (DOC), the lead agency for conservation at a central government level 
(Binning, 2000). This Act applies to all public conservation land (known as the conservation estate), 
about a third of New Zealand’s terrestrial land area (Binning, 2000; Craig et al., 2000; Norton & 
Miller, 2000; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2007). The RMA has 
a much wider jurisdiction; it governs the use of all New Zealand’s natural resources, with almost all 
forms of resource use affecting biodiversity (Schneider & Samkin, 2012).  
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In addition to the biodiversity related legislation identified in Figure 3, a number of national policies 
and non-legislative accords, strategies, international conventions, treaties and commissions also 
influence biodiversity conservation in New Zealand. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), for 
example, is an international legally-binding treaty that New Zealand has ratified (Schneider & Samkin, 
2012). As part of the country’s commitment to the CBD, and as a response to ongoing biodiversity 
decline, New Zealand has prepared the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (NZBS) (Anon, 2000). The 
NZBS sets out a range of national goals to conserve and manage New Zealand’s biodiversity and it is 
considered an important milestone for biodiversity conservation (Green, 2006). Critics of the NZBS, 
however, argue that as the NZBS has no legal mandate and it will be ineffective unless it is supported 
by legislation (Green, 2006; Seabrook-Davison, 2010). Seabrook-Davison (2010) adds, that existing 
legislation in New Zealand only has provisions for the protection of indigenous wildlife, not a 
directive for their conservation. A comparison with wildlife legislation in Australia and the US 
suggests New Zealand urgently requires a similarly dedicated threatened species legislation 
(Seabrook-Davison, 2010).  
The development of biodiversity policy in New Zealand has been done in most part by DOC, the 
Ministry for the Environment (responsible for setting environmental standards and guidelines), the 
Ministry for Primary Industries (lead Crown agency for terrestrial biodiversity), the Ministry of 
Fisheries (lead Crown agency for marine biodiversity), and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (Binning, 2000; Norton & Cochrane, 2000). The delivery of biodiversity outcomes also 
falls on several agencies, including DOC, the Ministry for Primary Industries, local government (both 
regional and city or district councils), research institutes and a range of NGO, community and iwi 
groups (Norton & Cochrane, 2000). A number of government-administered trusts and contestable 
funds (e.g. QEII National Trust, the Nature Heritage Fund, and the Nga Whenua Rahui fund) also 
assist with delivering biodiversity outcomes, specifically on private land (Binning, 2000; Schneider & 
Samkin, 2012).  
This evolving range of policies, organisations, and funds should be leading New Zealand towards 
more successful biodiversity conservation, however, the literature suggests otherwise (Brown, 
Stephens, Peart, & Fedder, 2015; Department of Conservation, 2014c; Green & Clarkson, 2005; 
Schneider & Samkin, 2012). Brown et al. (2015) state that the present structures in place to deliver 
biodiversity outcomes have not been sufficient and that more effective and robust solutions must be 
found – solutions which address both the fundamental and proximal divers of biodiversity loss.  
One reason for continued biodiversity decline is insufficient funding (Brown et al., 2015; Green, 
2006). Current shortfalls mean that DOC cannot adequately oversee and maintain all of New 
Zealand’s conservation estate nor fulfil its other functions effectively. Local and regional councils face 
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the same issue and private landowners and community groups have limited or no financial incentive 
to undertake biodiversity conservation. The need for a more coordinated and collaborative approach 
to biodiversity management has been echoed in the literature over the last 15 years (Binning, 2000; 
Brown et al., 2015). This is already occurring to some degree through DOC’s new shift to a 
partnerships model (Department of Conservation, 2014c), however, Brown et al. (2015) state that 
much more change is needed. Brown et al. (2015) also state that, whilst New Zealand has a 
comprehensive suite of legislation and regulatory tools available to safeguard biodiversity, these are 
often poorly implemented and the results inadequately monitored and complied with. Policy 
directions in some areas have also yet to emerge (e.g. for indigenous biodiversity under the RMA, for 
Bio-prospecting, and for the management of genetic resources) (Green, 2006). 
Lastly, the power of private interests to override public interests in biodiversity conservation is a 
foremost contributor to environmental and biodiversity decline (Brown et al., 2015; Walker et al., 
2009). Brown et al. (2015) believe that it is the reconciliation of these interests, and the broad 
alignment of their goals, that will lead the way to an enduring and flourishing native biodiversity. 
Biodiversity compensation offers one way in which to do this.  
2.5.3 Biodiversity Compensation in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, variations on biodiversity compensation have been around for a long time, however 
the concept has not yet been formalised into any regulatory system (Brown et al., 2013; Christensen, 
2010; Norton, 2009). This has elicited critique from several authors who suggest that the lack of 
policy framework and the inconsistent application of biodiversity compensation is having negative 
effects on the environment and on biodiversity (Christensen, 2010; Memon et al., 2004). Rive (2013) 
adds that the resulting ad hoc litigation, such as that incited by Buller Coal Limited’s Escarpment 
Mine Project on the Denniston Plateau, will also continue to occupy the time and resources of all 
stakeholders; something, he suggests, is of no benefit to anyone involved. 
 The New Zealand Department of Conservation (DOC) has been addressing the inconsistent approach 
to biodiversity compensation, in its more rigorous form of “offsetting,” by taking the lead in a Cross 
Departmental Research Pool project, supported by four other government agencies. This project, 
known as the New Zealand Biodiversity Offsets Programme (NZBOP), outlines methods for 
conducting and assessing biodiversity compensation or “offset” measures (Department of 
Conservation, 2014b). The NZBOP is, however, only a guidance document. There is still a 
considerable perceived need for a legal framework to regulate biodiversity compensation in New 
Zealand (Brown, Clarkson, Barton, et al., 2014).  
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Regardless of these concerns, biodiversity compensation is currently occurring in New Zealand under 
the Conservation Act and the Resource Management Act (Madsen et al., 2010), and to some degree 
also under the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (Department of Conservation, 2014b).  
The Conservation Act 1987 
The Conservation Act formed, and is administered by, the Department of Conservation (DOC). The 
Act governs the use of New Zealand’s conservation estate – about a third of New Zealand’s total land 
area (Binning, 2000). There are no explicit policy goals for biodiversity compensation within the 
Conservation Act, yet biodiversity compensation has been used and promoted at various times by 
DOC (Salmon, 2013). The only mention of any form of biodiversity compensation within the Act is in 
section 17X(d) where the Minister is given the option of imposing conditions such as “the payment of 
compensation for any adverse effects of the activity on the Crown’s or public interest in the land 
concerned, unless such compensation has been provided for in the setting of rent.” To date, no 
research has been completed on the extent to which biodiversity compensation is being used under 
the Conservation Act.  
The Conservation Act (1987, s170) states that: “Except as provided in subsection (3) or subsection 
(4), no activity shall be carried out in a conservation area unless authorised by a concession.” The 
concessions regime thus governs what activities can or cannot take place on public conservation 
land. According to the NZBOP, biodiversity compensation in the form of “offsets” can only be 
considered on public conservation land as part of conditions attached to a concession that aim to 
address any remaining adverse effects of the proposed activity (Department of Conservation, 2014b). 
Any concession application must first attempt to avoid, remedy, or mitigate any adverse effects of 
the activity that has been applied for; biodiversity compensation cannot be used as a substitute for 
this process (Department of Conservation, 2014b). Furthermore, public conservation land is held, 
and intended to be managed, for the purposes of conservation: any activity that does not comply 
with, or is inconsistent with, this purpose, or the provisions of the Conservation Act, or any other 
relevant conservation management planning document, should be declined by the Minister of 
Conservation (Department of Conservation, 2014b).  
Despite the strict provisions of the Conservation Act, there has been increasing commercial pressure 
on public conservation land and DOC officers have often felt obliged to issue concessions and mining 
access arrangements regardless (Salmon, 2013). According to Salmon (2013), biodiversity 
compensation and evidence of “net conservation gain” are increasingly part of the consideration of 
concession applications. This is despite the fact that the Conservation Act does not facilitate the 
balancing of conservation and development imperatives.  
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Whilst biodiversity compensation, as a concept, is not mentioned in the Conservation Act examples 
of regulated biodiversity compensation have already been exposed in the media. The Lake Matiri 
power scheme is a recent example. DOC approved this concession under the condition that the 
environmental and recreational impacts of the scheme were to be reduced to acceptable levels. 
Conditions were included which provided for additional conservation and recreation gains 
(Department of Conservation, 2011). The concessionaire, New Zealand Energy Ltd, was obliged to 
pay $105,000 to DOC to offset the residual impacts of the scheme. This money is going, amongst 
other things, towards enhancing the terrestrial habitat in the catchment, enhancing the freshwater 
aquatic habitat in the Buller River catchment and towards riparian planting to compensate for the 
loss of natural forest (Department of Conservation, 2011). Regulated biodiversity compensation 
measures, such as these, are currently occurring in an ad hoc fashion under the Conservation Act. A 
more formalised approach is recommended to reduce risk to biodiversity through the inappropriate 
implementation of compensation measures (Salmon, 2013).  
DOC appears to be actively researching the field of biodiversity compensation. The NZBOP guidelines 
have already been released and DOC staff are assigned to progress the science of biodiversity 
offsetting (Department of Conservation, 2014b). Other schemes such as conservation credits, where 
concessionaires are granted fee reductions as a reward for implementing additional conservation 
gains (Conservation Act, 1987, s17X(f)), also exist. In addition, biodiversity compensation measures 
are implemented on a voluntary basis by some concessionaires. Tourism concessionaires in particular 
are known to actively contribute to conservation (Thompson, 2005). Real Journeys, for instance, one 
of New Zealand’s largest tourism enterprises and the primary concessionaire within Fiordland 
National Park, undertakes a multitude of conservation initiatives. These include financial support for 
the Les Hutchins Conservation Foundation, stoat trapping, fundraising for DOC, and financial support 
for DOC’s endangered whio (Blue Duck) program (Thompson, 2005). These conservation initiatives 
can be seen as voluntary compensation for their operations within Fiordland National Park.  
The Resource Management Act 1991 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) is New Zealand’s primary piece of legislation regulating 
how the environment is to be managed. The RMA promotes the sustainable management of natural 
and physical resources on both private and public land, where sustainable management means:  
“managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, 
or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, 
and cultural well-being and for their health and safety while – 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
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(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment” 
(Resource Management Act, 1991, s5). 
The RMA does not explicitly address the concept of biodiversity compensation. Section 5(2)(c) of the 
RMA requires adverse effects on the environment to be avoided, remedied, or mitigated, with case 
law and policy statements and plans differing on whether a hierarchy exists in these terms 
(Department of Conservation, 2014b). Compensation measures have commonly been confused with 
mitigation (Brown, 2014), however, the High Court recently decided that compensation measures 
should not be viewed as mitigation, but as positive environmental effects (Department of 
Conservation, 2014b). As such they should be considered under Section 104(1)(a) and Section 5(2) 
(Department of Conservation, 2014b).  
Research by Brown (2014) illustrates that biodiversity compensation is being utilised under the RMA, 
with requirements for biodiversity compensation secured through resource consent conditions or, 
less commonly, through a side-agreement between the applicant and a third party (Brown, 2014; 
Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). Some examples of trades to date are illustrated in the literature 
(Christensen, 2007; Christensen & Barnes, 2009; Norton, 2007, 2009; Rive, 2013). “No net loss” is not 
considered a requirement in the RMA for a resource consent to be granted (Department of 
Conservation, 2014b). Instead, decision-makers weigh up a range of societal goals and make an 
overall judgement on whether the particular application meets the requirements of the RMA 
(Department of Conservation, 2014b).  
Although the RMA makes no explicit mention of biodiversity compensation, some Regional Plans, 
District Plans and Policy Statements do (e.g. Horizons One Plan). Councils also often employ internal 
practice notes to help them assess proposals under the RMA that include biodiversity compensation 
(e.g. Waikato Regional Council). Worth mentioning is the Proposed National Policy Statement for 
Indigenous Biodiversity (Ministry for the Environment, 2011), a much awaited national guidance 
document which provides leadership on biodiversity compensation and, in particular, offsetting. This 
Policy Statement will be similar to legislation in terms of its strength under the RMA and would 
compel local authorities and councils to implement biodiversity compensation appropriately 
(Madsen et al., 2011).  
The Crown Minerals Act 1991 
The Crown Minerals Act 1991 promotes the “prospecting for, exploration for, and mining of Crown 
owned minerals for the benefit of New Zealand.” (Crown Minerals Act, 1991, s1A). The Act deals with 
Access Arrangements, which regulate land access for mining and require either permission from the 
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relevant land owner or a concession under the Conservation Act if on public conservation land 
(Department of Conservation, 2014b). The Crown Minerals Act contains no statutory criteria for 
biodiversity compensation. Whether biodiversity compensation can be considered an appropriate 
and sufficient mechanism for counterbalancing the effects of mining developments on biodiversity, 
in terms of a proposed access arrangement, is the decision of the Minister of Conservation and/or 
other ministers (Department of Conservation, 2014b). To date, no systematic review has looked at 
the use of biodiversity compensation under the Crown Minerals Act.  
2.5.4 Evaluating Biodiversity Compensation in New Zealand 
Although there is widespread support for biodiversity compensation in New Zealand (Brown, 
Clarkson, Barton, et al., 2014), extensive concerns about policy ambivalence, poor implementation 
and administration, uncertain outcomes, non-compliance, and a lack of enforcement, reflect 
international experience (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 2012; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006; Race & 
Fonseca, 1996; Walker et al., 2009).  
The evaluation of biodiversity compensation in New Zealand has been limited to date. Only a few 
authors have studied how biodiversity compensation can be, and is being, used in New Zealand 
(Christensen, 2007; Denny, 2011; Department of Conservation, 2014b; Memon et al., 2004; Murphy, 
2006; Norton, 2007, 2009; Norton & Warburton, 2014; Overton et al., 2013). To date, the only 
systematic and quantitative evaluation of biodiversity compensation has been done by Brown (2014). 
Brown (2014) looked in depth at the outcomes associated with ecological compensation under the 
RMA and how variations in outcomes might be explained. Findings showed that the present practice 
of ecological compensation under the RMA is characterised by high levels of non-compliance (35.2% 
of ecological compensation requirements identified in RMA resource consent conditions were not 
met), non-linearities in compliance (compliance varied significantly between activity, applicant, and 
condition types), and a range of implementation issues. Despite significant stakeholder concerns, 
Brown (2014) identified strong support for the concept and support for a more robust, formalised 
approach.  
The evaluation of biodiversity compensation in New Zealand is regulation driven, although 
proponents are often required to self-monitor to some extent (Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). Under the 
RMA, for example, the issuing agency has a statutory duty to monitor whether consent conditions 
have been met and to undertake enforcement measures under the circumstance that compliance 
has not been achieved. The Ministry for the Environment also has a legal duty to carry out 
environmental monitoring and reporting under Section 31 of the Environment Act (1986) and Section 
24 of the RMA.   
 37 
There is a lack of information on the evaluation of biodiversity compensation under the Conservation 
Act. Conditions in concessions entailing some form of biodiversity compensation are enforceable 
(Conservation Act, 1987, s43), yet the enforcement process is perceived to be inconsistent (State 
Services Commission, Treasury, & Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010). The 
Controller and Auditor-General (2006) has expressed the need for a stronger, more centralised 
approach to compliance monitoring under the Conservation Act.  
2.6 Summary 
Biodiversity compensation promises a new way of addressing biodiversity loss, a way in which 
decisions regarding economic development are compelled to take into account biodiversity values. 
The growing body of literature on biodiversity compensation is, however, full of criticism on the 
validity of the concept and the limitations affecting its use. Some regard biodiversity compensation, 
in its rigorous form of “offsetting”, as a symbolic policy, that whilst being theoretically attractive, has 
shown to be ineffective in practical terms (Walker et al., 2009). This belief, that biodiversity 
compensation is simply not realistic due to structural, economic, and institutional factors, and that it 
does little but facilitate inappropriate development and pacify those with an aim to protect the 
environment, has cast significant doubts on whether improvements in methods and stronger 
legislation can help convalesce the concept, and ultimately on whether we should be supporting the 
concept at all (Burgin, 2008; Morris et al., 2006; Walker et al., 2009). However, despite overwhelming 
attention within the literature on the shortcomings of biodiversity compensation, most researchers 
conclude with tentative support for the concept and express an interest in working towards the 
resolution of any concerns (Gardner et al., 2013; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Gillespie, 2012; 
Kiesecker et al., 2010; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; Norton, 2009; Overton et al., 2013; Pilgrim et al., 
2013; Quintero & Mathur, 2011; Rega, 2013; Ten Kate et al., 2004; Virah-Sawmy et al., 2014). 
In New Zealand, evaluations of biodiversity compensation have focused almost solely on biodiversity 
compensation under the RMA (Brown et al., 2013; Christensen, 2010; Memon et al., 2004; Norton, 
2009). There is very little or no literature, which has evaluated biodiversity compensation under any 
other legislation in New Zealand. Brown (2014), in her research, identified the need for a study 
similar to hers, which would look at biodiversity compensation on public conservation land, under 
the Conservation Act. This study aims to fulfil this need by providing the first systematic evaluation of 
biodiversity compensation under the Conservation Act.  
This study will parallel part 1 of Brown (2014) and look at regulatory compliance with biodiversity 
compensation under the Conservation Act. Part 2 and 3 of Brown (2014), which look at practice and 
stakeholder perspectives, will not be replicated in this study.  
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
Biodiversity compensation is a technically complex, multifarious, imprecise and uncertain science 
(Burgin, 2008; Race & Fonseca, 1996; Walker et al., 2009). As such, a single method approach to 
assessing compliance with biodiversity compensation requirements in this study was abandoned in 
favour of a more comprehensive, mixed-methods approach. Such an approach addresses the 
complexities of biodiversity compensation by enabling various forms of inquiry to be used together 
(Bergman, 2008; Greene, 2005). This enriches research findings and enhances the overall 
understanding of the research area (Creswell, 2003; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Greene, 2005).  
For this study, the main purpose of the mixed methods approach was triangulation. Triangulation is 
where multiple research methods are used to converge on and verify the results of a study (Creswell 
& Clark, 2011). This enhances the validity, precision, and credibility of research findings (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011; Greene, 2005). A mixture of field assessments, independent reviews of agency records, 
spatial analysis, and interviews with key stakeholders enabled triangulation in this study.  
3.1 Information Gathering 
This research used a case study approach to examine levels of compliance with biodiversity 
compensation requirements. The use of case studies is a well-established research design method, 
often applied to complex, multi-faceted issues (Cassell & Symon, 2004; Crowe et al., 2011). Given the 
technically complex nature of biodiversity compensation, and the multifarious way in which it is 
employed in New Zealand, a case study approach was considered appropriate.  
Case studies in this research represent DOC concession contracts which specify some form of 
biodiversity compensation, typically within the special conditions section of the concession contracts. 
A minimum of 20 case studies, from within the South Island of New Zealand, were sought for the 
purpose of this research. This number fitted within the time constraints of the study, yet allowed 
variations in compliance to still be captured. The decision to restrict case studies to the South Island 
was also a result of time and budget constraints.  
Case studies were initially requested from DOC. A list of case study criteria (Table 1) was sent to DOC 
and they were asked to identify relevant case studies from within their concessions database. This 
approach to information gathering gave rise to several difficulties: 1. The information was considered 
quite dispersed; 2. concession contracts were not well defined or documented as including 
biodiversity compensation; 3. there was, within DOC, a lack of awareness about the term 
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“biodiversity compensation” and what did or did not constitute compensation; 4. some of the 
relevant information was potentially commercially sensitive, and; 5. DOC had limited resources 
available to collate the information.  
Table 1.  Case study criteria for data requested from DOC. 
  
1 A concession contract for an activity, structure or facility located within the South Island of 
New Zealand 
 
2 A concession contract issued between 1 January 1992 and 31 December 2013 under the 
Conservation Act 
 
3 A concession contract which included negative effect(s) on the biophysical environment, 
including, but not limited to: resource extraction, species loss, vegetation clearance, land 
alteration and/or discharges to land or water 
 
4 A concession contract which included a negotiation for biodiversity compensation* under the 
Conservation Act 
 
5 A concession contract in which biodiversity compensation requirements are specific and 
enforceable 
 
6 A concession contract for which reasonable time has elapsed, such that the activity, structure, 
or facility, for which permission was granted, should have been carried out 
 
* Biodiversity compensation can include, but is not limited to, species translocations, habitat 
restoration or creation, plantings, financial contributions, and weed or pest control 
 
Despite these drawbacks DOC maintained interest in this study. In order to gain access to the data 
within the constraints identified above, an agreement was obtained with DOC. This agreement 
allowed access to a workstation within the Christchurch DOC office and authorisation to search the 
Permissions database for 20 relevant case studies. The Permissions database was searched for 20 
concessions which included biodiversity compensation related conditions. This process was by no 
means straightforward as DOC’s concessions database contains information for several thousand 
concessions from all over the country. Also, no search function was available within the database 
which could identify concessions with biodiversity compensation related conditions.  
The process for identifying case studies involved first using the available search options in the 
database. These were used to limit concessions to those from within the South Island, those 
approved between 1 January 1992 and 31 December 2013, and to “active” concessions (criteria in 
Table 1). The other criteria in Table 1 had to be searched for manually. The total number of 
concessions resulting from the automated search was over 2300.  
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A systematic search of every single concession for specific and enforceable biodiversity 
compensation requirements was not possible due to time constraints. The process for selecting 
concessions instead involved a stratified random search where four concession activity types 
(telecommunications, structures, access and grazing) were first chosen. These activities were chosen 
for two reasons: first, they dominate concession figures (Figure 4); and second, they were advised by 
DOC staff to be those concessions most likely to include requirements for biodiversity compensation.  
 
Figure 4.  Number of active concessions by service or activity type (only those service or activity types 
where at least 250 concessions were granted in the 2013-2014 year) (Department of Conservation, 
2014a). 
It was considered statistically optimal for case studies to be both representative and random. As 
such, each activity type was systematically searched through in order to find five relevant concession 
case studies. A random search proved necessary as there were hundreds of concessions classified 
under each activity type. The random search involved manually searching through 10% of 
concessions under each activity type. This was extended by another random 10% if five relevant case 
studies had not yet been identified. If the random search resulted in more than five relevant 
concessions for a particular activity type, then this was narrowed down to five by favouring those 
concessions which included multiple biodiversity compensation conditions (as this would increase 
the overall sample size) and by favouring conditions with a variety in types of compensation. 
What did or did not comprise “biodiversity compensation” was at the discretion of the researcher 
and the supervisory team. Compensation clauses typically referred to additional conservation actions 
that went beyond what would be required under the traditional avoid-remedy-mitigate hierarchy. In 
some cases, it could be debated whether the action was “additional” or not, yet due to the loose 
definition of biodiversity compensation in New Zealand, the research time-frame, and the relatively 
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low occurrence of definitive cases of compensation, these cases were included. Assessing compliance 
with those conditions which marginally passed as compensation (e.g. species monitoring or transfer, 
which can be considered more as “avoidance” rather than compensation), was still considered useful 
for determining what selection of factors cause a concession holder to be more or less compliant. In 
total, of the concessions searched, approximately 15% included some form of compensation.   
The final 20 concession case studies were formally approved by DOC. DOC had the right (as part of a 
signed contract) to decline provision of certain information if it happened to be commercially 
sensitive, however, this was never exercised. Concession contract(s) and available monitoring files 
for each identified case study were provided by DOC.  
3.2 Assessing Compliance 
In order to identify levels of compliance with biodiversity compensation requirements, reliable 
measurements of outcomes were required. Measuring outcomes relied on having specific and 
enforceable goals, either policy-based or project based (Lee et al., 2005; Matthews & Endress, 2008). 
In New Zealand, as there are a lack of policy goals relating to biodiversity compensation (Brown, 
Clarkson, Stephens, et al., 2014; Christensen & Barnes, 2009; Memon et al., 2004), including within 
the Conservation Act, typical policy evaluation methods (Laurian et al., 2010) could not be used. To 
mitigate this, and to support a quantitative approach, the conditions accompanying each concession 
case study formed the goals against which compliance was assessed. Concession conditions have 
commonly been used in compliance monitoring as a reliable proxy for project goals, as they are both 
specific and enforceable. Conditions can compel actions, set timeframes and outline performance 
standards (Brown, 2014).  
In total, for the 20 concession case studies used in this study, there were 32 conditions compelling 
some form of biodiversity compensation. This ranged between one and five conditions per case 
study. Four conditions were excluded during the research process, due to the compensation action 
not yet being required or due to lack of information. As such, the final number of conditions assessed 
was 28.  
Compliance levels were assessed against these concession conditions, using an independent review 
approach. This approach stemmed from widespread critique that the field of conservation is 
characterised by a lack of post-implementation monitoring and evaluation (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 
2006). Low levels of routine compliance monitoring, poor agency record keeping and low 
enforcement rates are common, both overseas (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006; 
Reiss, Hernandez, & Brown, 2009) and in New Zealand (Brown et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2005; Tonkin 
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and Taylor, 2012). An independent review approach thus reduced the reliance on DOC records and 
allowed for a fairer and more consistent assessment of compliance. The merits of independent 
review are frequently noted within the literature (Brownlie et al., 2013). 
Levels of compliance were independently assessed using a range of methods. Firstly, a desktop 
assessment of compliance was completed using the concession contracts and monitoring files. This 
desktop assessment included simple spatial analysis using GIS, and was followed by consultation with 
key DOC staff involved with administrating and monitoring individual concessions. Field visits were 
then completed where practical, to confirm the extent of compliance. The intention was also to 
interview concessionaires, in order to verify information, however time constraints meant this was 
no longer feasible.  
A compliance scale was used to assess the degree of compliance concessionaires achieved with each 
biodiversity compensation condition. This method of assessing compliance was chosen as it has the 
support of regulatory agencies in New Zealand (Tonkin and Taylor, 2012) and it has also been used 
before in academic studies (Breaux et al., 2005; Brown, 2014). A scale, rather than a simple “yes or 
no” binary also makes results more meaningful (Brown, 2014). The compliance scale used in this 
study assessed compliance on a 0-3 scale, as illustrated in Table 2. It is important to note here that 
the term “complied” only applies to those conditions which were fully complied with (score 3), the 
other compliance categories simply reflect varying degrees of non-compliance.   
Table 2.  The compliance scale used to assess each compensatory condition in this study (adapted 
from Brown (2014)). 
Compliance scale Description 
 
0 – No compliance 
 
No level of compliance apparent with the stated condition 
 
1 – Low level of compliance 
 
Minor or insignificant achievement of compliance 
 
2 – Medium level of compliance 
 
Significant level of compliance with the stated condition, but 
falls short of full compliance 
 
3 – Satisfactory compliance 
 
Acceptable compliance that is within a practical margin of error 
and minor flexibility 
 
 
For the sake of consistency, the compliance score reflected compliance only with the condition in 
question. It did not translate to the seriousness of the adverse effect and it did not assess the 
sufficiency of the condition itself. A condition for instance may still have allowed for considerable 
vegetation loss, yet if the condition was met then the result was still a 3 on the compliance scale.  
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3.3 Assessing Variations in Compliance 
In New Zealand, variations in compliance with biodiversity compensation requirements on the 
conservation estate are poorly understood as there exists a general lack of information, empirical 
data, and peer reviewed literature on the subject. The present research has addressed this 
knowledge gap through an examination of the relationship between compliance and a number of 
spatial and non-spatial variables.  
The non-spatial variables used in this study were condition type, activity type, and applicant type. 
The spatial variables used were conservation land category and habitat type. The non-spatial 
variables were chosen as a reflection of the concession planning and management process. They 
were also similar to the variables used by Brown (2014), and variables used in overseas studies 
(Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006; Shimshack, 2007), thus facilitating a national 
and international comparison. The choice of spatial variables originates from concerns and 
observations within the literature that some land types (be it due to their legal status, or land cover 
type) are more vulnerable to lower levels of monitoring and compliance (Breaux et al., 2005; Neyer & 
Zurn, 2001; Quigley & Harper, 2006). The aim of this assessment was that these variables might 
provide a clearer understanding of the intricacies of non-compliance and potentially lead to an 
improvement of land and biodiversity management practices. 
3.3.1 Condition Type 
Compliance levels are known to vary between types of conditions and condition goals (Brown, 2014; 
Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006). This might be due to resourcing, the availability 
of expertise, or other variables.  
To investigate the relationship between condition type and compliance, conditions specifying 
biodiversity compensation were grouped into two categories: administrative and non-administrative. 
Administrative conditions were paper-based conditions, such as compensation payments or the 
creation of a conservation covenant. Non-administrative conditions were action-based, such as 
planting or weed and pest control. Conditions were then further split into groups that broadly 
aligned with their goals or purpose (Table 3). Levels of compliance accompanying these different 
condition goals were compared to assess which types of biodiversity compensation measures were 
more likely to be complied with and which required attention to enhance levels of compliance.   
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Table 3.  Biodiversity compensation concession condition types. 
Administrative Non-administrative 
Compensation payment Planting 
Conservation covenant Species management programme 
Environmental premium Species monitoring or transfer 
Financial contribution Weed and/or pest control 
Plan content  
 
3.3.2 Activity Type 
Compliance levels are known not to be uniform across various activity types (Brown et al., 2013; 
Shimshack, 2007). Brown (2014) found that throughout New Zealand, expert practitioners could 
easily recount which activity types dominated consent application figures under the RMA and which 
were known to be more non-compliant. Under the Conservation Act in New Zealand, structural and 
grazing concessions dominate concession applications (Figure 4), but it is unknown which activity 
types are associated with higher or lower levels of compliance.  
To examine differences in compliance between activity types, conditions were grouped into activity 
types and compared. The activity types chosen were: telecommunications, structures, access, and 
grazing. For each of these activity types there is a slightly different concession application process 
(Department of Conservation, 2015) which may have an effect on compliance.  
3.3.3 Applicant Type 
Compliance levels in previous studies were shown to vary recognisably between applicant types 
(Brown et al., 2013; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Shimshack, 2007). To assess whether this held true 
for concession applicant types under the Conservation Act, concession applicants were assembled 
into three categories: individuals, private companies and organisations, and public companies and 
organisations. Compliance levels were then compared between these three categories. 
3.3.4 Conservation Land Category 
There are many different types of conservation land, some of which are: wilderness areas, national 
parks, conservation parks, ecological reserves, marine reserves, wildlife areas and stewardship areas. 
Each type of conservation land has a legal status that reflects its value and explains why it is 
protected. National parks, for instance, are protected “for their intrinsic worth and for the benefit, 
use, and enjoyment of the public, areas of New Zealand that contain scenery of such distinctive 
quality, ecological systems, or natural features so beautiful, unique, or scientifically important that 
their preservation is in the national interest” (National Parks Act, 1980, s4(1)). In contrast, “every 
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stewardship area shall be so managed that its natural and historic resources are protected” 
(Conservation Act, 1987, s25). This definition is much vaguer and translates into weaker legal 
protection (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2013).  
The legal status of conservation land affects what activities can take place there and how the land is 
managed. There has been some controversy with this recently, as the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment (2013) has identified that many areas of stewardship land actually warrant 
higher legal protection. Stewardship areas seem to be threatened more than any other conservation 
land category by developmental and political pressures (Salmon, 2013). The Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment (2013) noted that, because stewardship land is not held for a 
specific purpose, concessions are perceived to be easier to gain. Whether this lower legal status 
correlates with lower levels of monitoring and compliance is unknown.  
It is thought that increasing legal protection enhances compliance (Neyer & Zurn, 2001). The legal 
status of conservation land types is therefore hypothesised to correlate with compliance.  Each 
concession case study, in this research, has been identified according to which conservation land 
category it is located within. The categories used are a reflection of DOC’s land classification 
categories (1-4), which are used to calculate environmental premiums for telecommunication 
concessions (environmental premiums are intended to reflect the environmental impact of the 
Concession Activity on the Land). These categories fall along a scale of legal protection (Category 1 
most protected and Category 4 least protected):  
- Category 1: National Park, nature reserve, ecological area, national reserve, wilderness area, 
wildlife sanctuary or sanctuary area. 
- Category 2: Conservation (forest) park, scientific reserve, historic reserve, wildlife 
management reserve, scenic reserve or wildlife refuge.  
- Category 3: Recreation reserve, government and local purpose reserve, other reserves, 
stewardship areas, water course areas or marginal strips.  
- Category 4: Open pasture under grazing in Category 3 land status and unprotected or non-
reserve land held for administrative purposes.  
The aim was to find out whether a correlation exists between compliance and conservation land 
category, as a result of variations in legal protection. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of these 
conservation land categories within the study area with the exception of Category 4 land which has 
been grouped with Category 3 land for the purposes of mapping.  
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Figure 5 and Table 4 also show the distribution of concession case studies across these land category 
types.  
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Figure 5.  The distribution of concession case studies across conservation land categories within the 
conservation estate on the South Island of New Zealand (study area). 
 
Note. Scale is kept small to retain anonymity of Concessionaires. 
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Table 4.  The number of concession case-studies specific to each conservation land category type. 
Conservation Land 
Category 
Number of 
case-studies 
Category 1 4 
Category 2 4 
Category 3 7 
Category 4 5 
 
3.3.5 Habitat Type 
Biodiversity compensation projects worldwide have shown that compliance varies with habitat type 
(Breaux et al., 2005; Quigley & Harper, 2006; Race & Fonseca, 1996). Most of these projects have 
focused on varying wetland habitats. In this study the effect of habitat type on compliance has been 
assessed at a much broader scale, as the public conservation estate of New Zealand contains a vast 
array of habitat types.  
Several land classification systems were considered for defining habitat type: The New Zealand Land 
Resource Inventory (NZLRI), the New Zealand Land Cover Database (LCDB) and Land Environments of 
New Zealand (LENZ). Both LENZ and the LCDB were considered in detail. The NZLRI was dismissed as 
it focuses on land use capability and the ability of land to sustain agriculture, not on defining habitat 
type. LENZ is a classification of New Zealand terrestrial environments. It uses 15 climate, landform, 
and soil variables to group together areas with similar environmental conditions (Leathwick et al., 
2002). These areas are then considered likely to have similar potential ecosystem character 
(Leathwick et al., 2002). LENZ does not consider existing land cover while the LCDB does. The LCDB is 
a digital map of New Zealand’s land surface, created by grouping together similar land cover classes 
identified from satellite images (Grüner, Thompson, & Gapare, 2003). Currently there are 4 versions 
of the LCDB available, each version represents land cover at a different point in time. The latest, 
version 4, is based on satellite imagery from the summer 2012/2013 and was released in June 2014.  
The LCDB was chosen for this study as the most appropriate land classification system for defining 
habitat type. The LCDB focuses on existing habitats, not those that could potentially exist (LENZ). 
Also, the spatial resolution of habitat types was considered more meaningful for the size of the study 
area with the LCDB. 
In this study, concession case studies were identified and grouped according to which LCDB version 4 
category they were located within. This was accomplished using a spatial join in GIS. Compliance 
levels were then assessed and compared between these different habitat groups. The distribution of 
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concession case studies across the various habitat types within the study area are illustrated in Figure 
6. Grüner et al. (2003) explain these habitat types in more detail. 
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Figure 6.  The distribution of concession case studies across habitat types (LCDB4) within the 
conservation estate on the South Island of New Zealand (study area). 
 
Note. Scale is kept small to retain anonymity of Concessionaires. 
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3.4 Assessing Predictors of Compliance 
This research project explored the role that variables within the concession process, the concession 
document itself, and social circumstances surrounding the concession have on predicting and 
affecting eventual levels of compliance. The majority of variables chosen for this research are 
variables over which DOC has some influence. As such, DOC has had input into their selection. An 
understanding of these variables and their effect on compliance was considered important in 
providing DOC with useful information to assess the effectiveness of their concession administration, 
monitoring, and management processes. It was hoped that this would allow DOC to manage the risk 
of trade-offs and target monitoring to ultimately reduce the risk to biodiversity and increase positive 
biodiversity outcomes associated with compensation measures.  
This research project examined a range of “process variables” related to the concession application 
process (Table 5) and “concession variables,” which related to each concession’s requirements and 
the nature of the compensatory action(s) (Table 6). A range of social variables were also examined as 
to their relationship with compliance (Table 7). These variables were all identified either in the 
literature or by DOC staff as potentially affecting compliance and the implementation of biodiversity 
compensation.  
To understand each variable’s importance in predicting or otherwise influencing compliance, an 
assessment of correlation with compliance was undertaken. 
Table 5.  Process variables that may impact levels of compliance. 
Process Variable Explanation 
Professional ecologist Was a professional ecologist engaged by the applicant 
during the process of applying for concession? 
Early mention Was the compensation action mentioned early in the 
process, or late in the process in response to DOC or 
submitter concerns? 
Applicant proposed Was there evidence that the applicant proposed the 
compensation? 
Notification Was the concession a notified concession? 
Head office Was the application processed in the Christchurch, 
Dunedin or Hokitika head office? 
Date of approval Was the concession granted a long or short time ago?* 
Review Has the concession undergone review? 
* A long time ago is 2010 or earlier, a short time ago is after 2010. 
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Table 6.  Concession variables that may impact levels of compliance. 
Concession Variable Explanation 
Timing Was the compensation action required prior, during or 
following the activity that had been granted concession? 
Bond Was a bond required as part of the concession? 
Monitoring Was monitoring required as part of the concession? 
Location Was the compensation action required onsite or offsite? 
Concession duration Was the concession of short, medium, or long duration?* 
Compensation duration Was the compensation action a “one-off” or did it require 
ongoing intervention and maintenance? 
* Short= 0-10 years, medium= 11-30 years, long= 31+ years.   
Table 7.  Social variables that may impact levels of compliance. 
Social Variable Explanation 
Enforcement Does the concessionaire have a record of enforcement 
actions being taken against them by DOC? 
Pending concessions Does the concessionaire have any pending concession 
applications or renewals? 
DOC visitations Does the area relevant to the concession get visited 
frequently by DOC?* 
Public visitations Does the area relevant to the concession get visited 
frequently by members of the general public?** 
Concessionaire change Has the concession been transferred to a new 
concessionaire? 
* Frequently= at least one visit or drive-by a year. 
**Frequently=at least one visit or drive-by a week.  
3.5 Data Analysis 
The Fisher’s exact test was used in this study to determine statistically significant relationships 
between the variables mentioned in sections 3.3 and 3.4, and compliance. The dataset used in this 
study consists of multiple nominal independent variables and one ordinal dependent variable 
(compliance). The Fisher’s exact test, whilst not ideal for this dataset (it is typically only applied to 
nominal data), was still considered the most suitable statistical test. 
Many environmental compliance studies use the Pearson’s Chi-squared test which compares counts 
of categorical responses between two (or more) independent variables (Bailey, Hobbs, & Saunders, 
1992; Brown, 2014; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Wild & Seber, 1999). However, the Chi-squared test, 
as well as the similarly popular G-test of independence, rely on nominal data and are considered 
inaccurate when expected numbers are small (Agresti & Finlay, 2009; McDonald, 2014; Simonoff, 
2003). The Chi-squared test relies on the assumption that no more than 20% of the expected counts 
are less than five and all individual expected counts are one or more (Yates, Moore, & McCabe, 
1999). The presence of ordinal data plus the small expected counts in this study thus discounted the 
use of these types of independence tests.  
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Several other well-known statistical tests, such as the Kruskall Wallis test, the Mann-Whitney U test, 
and a linear regression model and anova, were also considered but rejected. The Kruskall Wallis test, 
for instance, works well for when there is one nominal and one ordinal variable and the data is not 
normally distributed, which it would have to be for a one-way anova (McDonald, 2014). The Kruskall 
Wallis test also extends the Mann-Whitney U test to more than two groups, which is necessary for 
this study, however, it does not work when distributions are heteroscedastic, which is the case in this 
study. A linear regression model and anova were also discounted in this study as the dataset is too 
small and the ordinal scale too short (McDonald, 2014).  
The Fisher’s exact test was chosen as an appropriate and well regarded compromise (McDonald, 
2014; Wild & Seber, 1999). It is an independence test similar to the chi-squared test but more suited 
towards smaller sample sizes (McDonald, 2014). It is also a statistical hypothesis test used to 
determine whether observations on two or more variables, expressed in a contingency table, are 
independent of each other, with the null hypothesis stating that they are (McDonald, 2014; Wild & 
Seber, 1999). In doing this the Fisher’s exact test does not, unlike many other tests, calculate the 
probability of a test statistic value, but instead it calculates the probability of getting the observed 
data, and all data with more extreme variations, under the null hypothesis that the observed and 
expected data are the same (McDonald, 2014). 
In this study, the Fisher’s exact test was used to assess whether variations in compliance, with 
different spatial and non-spatial variables (Section 3.3) as well as predictor variables (Section 3.4), 
were statistically significant (i.e. the variable had a significant relationship with compliance). As the 
Fisher’s exact test applies to nominal data, the ordinal variable (compliance) had to be treated as if it 
was nominal. This means that, whilst the results show whether or not there is a significant 
correlation between each variable and compliance, information in the ordering is ignored. Results in 
this study were considered significant, and the null hypothesis was rejected, when the Fisher’s exact 
test resulted in a probability (p value) smaller than 0.05 (Wild & Seber, 1999). This p value refers to a 
5% level of significance commonly used in statistics (Wild & Seber, 1999). 
The Fisher’s exact test relies on two assumptions. First, like any independence test, it assumes 
individual observations are independent. Second, unlike other independence tests, it assumes that 
row and column totals are fixed. The latter of these assumptions has caused some critique and 
controversy amongst statisticians as row and column totals cannot always be fixed (McDonald, 2014; 
Upton, 1992). In this study we know from the start the number of conditions for each variable (row 
totals), however, we are not dealing with fixed compliance scores (column totals). McDonald (2014) 
states that, in this case, the results of the Fisher’s exact test are more conservative than exact. 
McDonald (2014) goes on to say that, despite this, the Fisher’s exact test is still the favoured 
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approach when dealing with categorical data and small sample sizes. The limitations of the Fisher’s 
exact test for this study mean that significant analysis will also be done using just observations.   
3.6 Summary 
This study used a mixed-methods approach, combining spatial, archival and field ecology data, to 
assess levels of compliance with biodiversity compensation requirements. This approach was 
considered appropriate as it ensured a range of data was available to verify and triangulate on what 
is considered a complex research area (Bergman, 2008; Creswell & Clark, 2011).  
The mixed-methods approach was applied to 28 biodiversity compensation conditions, sourced from 
20 concession case-studies throughout the South Island of New Zealand. These case-studies were 
obtained from DOC’s Permissions database.  
A compliance scale was used to assess the degree of compliance concessionaires achieved with each 
biodiversity compensation condition. This approach has the support of regulatory agencies in New 
Zealand (Tonkin and Taylor, 2012) and it has also been used before in academic studies (Breaux et al., 
2005; Brown, 2014). The compliance scale assessed compliance on a 0-3 scale; a score of 3 equalled 
full compliance and scores of 0-2 equalled varying degrees of non-compliance. This was considered a 
more descriptive way of reporting on compliance than a simple “yes or no” binary.  
The Fisher’s exact test was subsequently used to determine any statistically significant relationships 
between a number of variables and compliance. The Fisher’s exact test was considered appropriate, 
as the study deals primarily with multiple nominal categorical variables and a small sample size 
(McDonald, 2014). The variables examined in the study include a range of spatial and non-spatial 
variables as well as variables within the concession process, the concession itself, and social 
circumstances surrounding the concession. The aim was to determine if any of these variables had a 
significant effect on compliance. This hypothesis originates from findings in the literature which 
illustrate non-uniformities in compliance across a range of variables (Brown et al., 2013; Dasgupta, 
Hettige, & Wheeler, 2000; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006; Shimshack, 2007). 
The limitations of the Fisher’s exact test, and the statistical restrictions of a small sample size, mean 
that this research has also placed significant emphasis on the observed patterns and trends within 
the data.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Of the 28 conditions assessed, 19 were complied with (Figure 7). This translates to an overall 
compliance rate of approximately 68%, or two-thirds. The flip-side of this is that a third of conditions 
were, to varying degrees [0 (7%), 1 (7%), and 2 (18%)], not complied with. 
 
Figure 7.  Overall level of compliance with conditions specifying biodiversity compensation under the 
Conservation Act. 
4.1 Variations in Compliance 
4.1.1 Condition Type 
Administrative conditions were complied with (score of three) more often than non-administrative 
conditions (73% versus 65% (Table 8)). However, some level of compliance was always attained with 
non-administrative conditions, whereas 18% of administrative conditions were not complied with at 
all.  
The Fisher’s exact test yielded a result of 0.056. Whilst this result is statistically insignificant, it is 
highly suggestive of a relationship between condition type and compliance. Rossi (2010), for 
example, states that a borderline p value provides only weak evidence for accepting the null 
hypothesis, especially when combined with a small sample size. Future research may thus want to 
follow up on the significance of variations in compliance with condition type. 
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Table 8. The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for condition types. 
Condition Type Number 0 1 2 3 
Administrative 11 18 9 0 73 
Non-administrative 17 0 6 29 65 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
 
Condition types were further broken down into condition goals (see Section 3.3.1). Five, out of a total 
of nine, condition goals exhibited full compliance (Table 9). Compensation payments exhibited the 
lowest level of compliance. Weed and/or pest control measures were by far the most common form 
of compensation. These weed and/or pest control measures often just fell short of being complied 
with.  
The Fisher’s exact test revealed no significant relationship between compliance and condition goals 
(p = 0.398). The small expected counts in each condition goal category make it unlikely that these 
results accurately depict expected compliance. 
Table 9.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for condition goals within 
administrative and non-administrative condition categories. 
Condition Goal Number 0 1 2 3 
Administrative      
Compensation payment 3 67 0 0 33 
Conservation covenant 1 0 0 0 100 
Environmental premium 2 0 0 0 100 
Financial contribution 3 0 0 0 100 
Plan content 2 0 50 0 50 
Non-administrative      
Planting 2 0 0 50 50 
Species management 
programme 1 
0 0 0 100 
Species monitoring or 
transfer 3 
0 0 0 100 
Weed and/or pest 
control 11 
0 9 36 55 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
4.1.2 Applicant Type 
Public organisations and companies were the most compliant (75%), followed by individuals (67%), 
and then private organisations and companies (64%) (Table 10).  Interestingly, whilst public 
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organisations and companies exhibited the highest rate of compliance, they also exhibited the 
highest rate of zero compliance (Table 10).  
The Fisher’s exact test yielded a result of 0.734. This indicates that whilst differences in compliance 
are apparent (Table 10), there is no statistically significant relationship between applicant type and 
compliance. Just because public organisations and companies exhibit a higher rate of compliance in 
this study, does not mean they exhibit a greater likelihood of attaining compliance.  
Table 10.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for applicant types. 
Applicant Type Number 0 1 2 3 
Individual 6 0 0 33 67 
Private organisation or 
company 14 
7 7 21 64 
Public organisation or 
company 8 
13 13 0 75 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
4.1.3 Activity Type 
Conditions which formed part of structural concessions were the most complied with (88%), followed 
closely by conditions for telecommunications concessions (86%) (Table 11). Conditions for grazing 
concessions were complied with the least (40%). Interestingly, those grazing conditions which were 
not complied with all received a score of two, indicating they were only just short of being complied 
with. Access concessions were the only activity type for which some conditions were not complied 
with at all (score of zero).  
Despite the variation in compliance (Table 11), the Fisher’s exact test found no statistically significant 
relationship between activity type and compliance (p = 0.097).  
Table 11.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for activity types. 
Activity Type Number 0 1 2 3 
Access 8 25 13 13 50 
Grazing 5 0 0 60 40 
Structure 8 0 13 0 88 
Telecommunications 7 0 0 14 86 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
4.1.4 Conservation Land Category 
Compliance was highest with conditions relevant to concessions on category 1 conservation land; 
100% of condition requirements were complied with (Table 12). The lowest level of compliance was 
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with conditions from concessions on category 4 conservation land (40%). Category 4 conservation 
land consists mainly of open pasture under grazing in category 3 land status. As such, the compliance 
results are identical to the compliance results in Table 11 with conditions from grazing concessions.   
Variation in compliance was the highest with conditions relevant to concessions on category 3 
conservation land (includes stewardship land). The majority (67%) of condition requirements, 
however, were complied with (Table 12).  
The Fisher exact test yielded a result of 0.218. This indicates that, despite the range in compliance, 
no statistically significant relationship exists between compliance and conservation land category.  
Table 12.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for conservation land category 
types. 
Conservation Land 
Category Number 0 1 2 3 
Category 1 6 0 0 0 100 
Category 2 5 0 20 20 60 
Category 3 12 17 8 8 67 
Category 4 5 0 0 60 40 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
4.1.5 Habitat Type 
The majority of conditions (13) applied to concessions within the Indigenous Forest LCDB category 
and almost all of these were complied with (92%) (Table 13). Conditions relevant to three of the eight 
habitat categories featured in this study (Marine, Built-up Area, and Sub Alpine Shrubland) were 
100% complied with. Unfortunately, not much weight can be placed on these scores as each of these 
habitat categories is represented by only a single condition.  
The habitat type category that performed the poorest was High Producing Exotic Grassland. 0% of 
condition requirements were complied with (Table 13).  
The Fisher’s exact test yielded a statistically significant result of 0.034. This indicates that compliance 
varied significantly with habitat type. The small expected counts, however, confound rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Future research is recommended to follow up on this particular variable.  
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Table 13.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for habitat types (LCDB4).  
Habitat Type (LCDB4) Number 0 1 2 3 
(Marine) 1 0 0 0 100 
Broadleaved Indigenous 
Hardwoods 
2 0 0 50 50 
Built-up Area 
(settlement) 
1 0 0 0 100 
Deciduous Hardwoods 3 0 33 33 33 
High Producing Exotic 
Grassland 
3 33 0 67 0 
Indigenous Forest 13 8 0 0 92 
Low Producing 
Grassland 
4 0 25 25 50 
Sub Alpine Shrubland 1 0 0 0 100 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
4.2 Predictors of Compliance 
4.2.1 Process Variables 
Seven process variables were identified as potentially having an impact on compliance (Table 5). Two 
of these variables (whether the compensation action was mentioned early or late in the application 
process and whether the compensation action was proposed by the applicant or not) had to be 
removed from the analysis due to insufficient information. 
Table 14 illustrates that conditions from notified concessions were complied with more (78%) than 
conditions from non-notified concessions (50%). When a professional ecologist was involved the 
level of compliance was also higher (75%) versus when one was not involved (63%).  
No statistically significant relationships were found between compliance and any of the process 
variables assessed in this study (Table 14). None of these variables can thus be considered predictors 
of compliance. 
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Table 14.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for process variables. 
Process variable Number 0 1 2 3 p value (Fisher) 
Professional ecologist 
involved 
12 8 8 8 75 
0.834 
Professional ecologist 
not involved 
16 6 6 25 63 
Concession notified 18 6 6 11 78 
0.393 Concession non-
notified 
10 10 10 30 50 
Application processed 
by Christchurch Office 
6 0 33 17 50 
0.180 Application processed by Dunedin Office 
10 10 0 30 60 
Application processed 
by Hokitika Office 
12 8 0 8 83 
Concession approved 
long time ago 
23 9 9 13 70 
0.684 
Concession approved 
short time ago 
5 0 0 40 60 
Concession 
undergone review 
9 11 0 22 67 
1.000 
Concession not 
undergone review 
19 5 11 16 68 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
*p < .05. 
4.2.2 Concession Variables 
Six concession variables were identified as potentially having an effect on compliance (Table 6). One 
of these (location), was left out of the analysis as it linked directly to condition type (administrative 
conditions were not site-related and non-administrative conditions required compensation only 
onsite) and therefore did not reveal anything new.  
A statistically significant relationship exists between compensation duration (whether the action was 
one-off or ongoing) and compliance. One-off compensation actions are more likely to be complied 
with than ongoing compensation actions (p = 0.037) (Table 15).  
Whilst there are no other statistically significant relationships between the remaining concession 
variables and compliance, Table 15 shows some interesting variations. For instance, there appears to 
be quite a difference in compliance between cases where monitoring was required (59%) and not 
required (82%). Intriguingly, compliance was higher for cases where monitoring was not required. 
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Compliance was also higher with cases which included the requirement for a bond (75%), versus 
those which did not (65%).  
Table 15.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for concession variables. 
Concession variable Number 0 1 2 3 p value (Fisher) 
Action required prior 
to activity 
11 18 9 0 73 
0.258 Activity required during activity 
12 0 8 33 58 
Activity required 
following activity 
5 0 0 20 80 
Bond required 8 13 0 13 75 
1.000 
Bond not required 20 5 10 20 65 
Monitoring required 17 6 6 29 59 
0.185 Monitoring not 
required 
11 9 9 0 82 
Concession duration 
long 
8 13 13 13 63 
0.788 Concession duration medium 
9 0 0 11 89 
Concession duration 
short 
11 9 9 27 55 
Action one-off 13 15 8 0 77 
0.037* 
Action ongoing 15 0 7 33 60 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
*p < .05. 
4.2.3 Social Variables 
Five social variables were identified as potentially having an effect on compliance (Table 7). One 
variable (enforcement) was left out of the analysis as 100% of cases involved concessionaires with no 
history of enforcement actions taken against them by DOC. 
Table 16 shows a large difference in compliance exists between cases where a concessionaire had 
pending concession applications and/or renewals (100%) and where they did not (61%). Table 16 also 
shows that cases with frequent DOC visits exhibited a higher level of compliance than cases with 
infrequent DOC visits. Cases with frequent DOC visits also never scored a zero on the compliance 
scale, as opposed to those cases rarely visited by DOC. Whilst those cases frequently visited by DOC 
staff exhibited a higher level of compliance, those visited frequently by the general public did not.  
 62 
The Fisher’s exact test yielded no statistically significant relationships between any of the social 
variables and compliance. None of these variables can thus be considered predictors of compliance.  
Table 16.  The distribution of cases (%) along the compliance scale for social variables. 
Social variable Number 0 1 2 3 p value (Fisher) 
Pending concession 
applications and/or 
renewals 
5 0 0 0 100 
0.803 No pending 
concession 
applications and/or 
renewals 
23 9 9 22 61 
Frequent DOC visits 12 0 0 25 75 
0.487 
Infrequent DOC visits 16 13 13 13 63 
Frequent public visits 11 0 18 27 55 
0.168 Infrequent public 
visits 
17 12 0 12 77 
Concession 
transferred to a new 
concessionaire 
7 14 0 14 71 
0.885 
Concession not 
transferred to a new 
concessionaire 
21 5 10 19 67 
Note. All (%) cases along the compliance scale have been rounded to zero decimal places, as a result, scores do 
not always add to 100%.  
*p < .05. 
4.3 Summary 
The results of this study show that overall compliance with biodiversity compensation conditions 
under the Conservation Act is about 68%. This means that approximately a third of biodiversity 
compensation conditions were, to varying degrees [0 (7%), 1 (7%), and 2 (18%)], not complied with.  
Compliance varied suggestively with condition type (p = 0.056) and significantly with habitat type 
(0.034). With regards to habitat type, the small expected counts confounded rejection of the null 
hypothesis. Further research, involving a larger sample size, would be required to follow up on this.  
Compliance did not vary significantly with any of the other spatial and non-spatial variables, 
however, some interesting patterns in compliance did emerge. Public organisations and companies, 
for instance, demonstrated a higher rate of compliance than other applicant types. Conditions from 
structural and telecommunications concessions exhibited a much higher compliance rate than 
conditions from grazing and access concessions. Variations in compliance also emerged as a result of 
the variable “conservation land category.” Compliance was highest with conditions relevant to 
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category 1 conservation land and lowest with conditions relevant to category 4 conservation land. 
This reflects the level of legal protection.  
18 “predictor” variables, which formed part of the concession process, the concession itself, and 
social circumstances surrounding the concession, were hypothesised to have an impact on the 
eventual level of compliance. Of these 18 variables, 14 could be analysed. One of these, 
“compensation duration,” had a statistically significant relationship with compliance. One-off 
conditions were complied with significantly more than conditions requiring ongoing intervention and 
maintenance.  
Other predictor variables showed some interesting, yet statistically insignificant, variations in 
compliance. Compliance was higher, for instance, with cases where the concession was notified as 
well as with cases where the concession included a bond. Compliance was lower with frequent public 
visits and, surprisingly, with cases where monitoring was required. Considering the limits of the 
Fisher’s exact test (Section 3.5) and the small sample size, these descriptive results are worth 
consideration.   
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
5.1 Compliance 
The overall rate of compliance with biodiversity compensation conditions under the Conservation Act 
was 68%. This means approximately a third of biodiversity compensation conditions were, to varying 
degrees, not complied with. These rates of compliance and non-compliance are similar to the 64.8% 
rate of compliance found by Brown (2014) for ecological compensation conditions under the RMA in 
New Zealand. Compliance with compensation requirements appears to be just marginally higher 
under the Conservation Act as opposed to under the RMA. The sample size in this study is, however, 
much smaller. It follows that the margin of error involved would render the results approximately 
similar. Compliance was expected to be higher under the Conservation Act as this Act applies to 
public conservation land and the RMA primarily to private land. Compliance on public land was 
expected to be higher due to public scrutiny (Dasgupta et al., 2000) as well as due to the strict, 
conservation focused, provisions of the Conservation Act.  
Whilst a 32% level of non-compliance should never be considered acceptable, this level of non-
compliance is comparable to, and even an improvement on, what has been reported in various 
international studies. For example, a study of compensatory wetland mitigation in Massachusetts US 
found 54.4% of wetland projects did not comply with the State of Massachusetts wetland regulations 
(Veneman & Brown, 2001). Worse, a study of habitat compensation under the Canadian Fisheries Act 
1985 found that more than 85% of 124 developments associated with fish habitat were non-
compliant with conditions (Harper & Quigley, 2005). Closer to home, in Western Australia, an 
environmental auditing study of artificial waterways found a more similar non-compliance rate of 
37% with conditions related to the mitigation of adverse effects (Bailey et al., 1992).  
A number of factors observed during the course of this study might be inhibiting compliance with 
biodiversity compensation requirements under the Conservation Act. Firstly, there does not appear 
to be a systematic and coordinated approach to compliance monitoring of concession conditions. 
This observation reflects that of the Controller and Auditor-General (2006) (see Section 2.5.4). 
Observations showed that the level of monitoring varied according to the type and scale of the 
activity for which a concession had been granted. Grazing concessions, for instance, were seen to get 
monitored annually by DOC staff (although this was not always the case) whilst telecommunications 
concessions usually received only a single inspection. Large scale concessions, with substantial 
environmental impacts, sometimes had an assigned 3rd party compliance officer, or DOC staff 
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member, routinely performing site inspections. Site access also tended to affect the level of 
compliance monitoring. Concessions along major state highways, for instance, received more 
frequent checks as a result of routine drive-bys. Anecdotal evidence adds that a lot of compliance 
monitoring is also done ad hoc and reactively as a result of observations and/or complaints made by 
the general public.  
Aside from the inconsistent level of compliance monitoring there also seemed to be inconsistencies 
in compliance reporting and data management. Only seven of the 20 case studies had any record on 
file of compliance monitoring, with the conditions of interest for this research. As such, DOC staff 
members were heavily relied upon to provide additional insight and knowledge. This they were able 
to do for 16 out of the 20 case studies. Deficiencies in compliance reporting and data management 
were illustrated particularly with regards to one case study, where one of the compensation 
conditions required ongoing monitoring and maintenance, this particular concession was transferred 
to a new concessionaire, yet neither the new concessionaire nor DOC had any record of the 
concession activity or their obligations.  
Compliance reporting and data management was further observed to be problematic due to a large 
reliance on concessionaires to self-monitor and report. Whilst this is understandable, as it alleviates 
pressure on DOC, self-monitoring can be poorly conducted and compliance information can be 
misrepresented (Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). Compounding this issue is an inconsistent approach by 
DOC to compliance reporting. For instance, at times DOC staff members were aware of a site 
inspection that had taken place, but there was no documentation of it. Staff member turn-over and 
subsequent loss of concession specific knowledge complicates this further. In addition, when 
compliance information was recorded, it was done in a number of different ways (i.e. email chains, 
invoices, memos, official inspection reports). These records were then kept either on paper file 
and/or on electronic file, with the former scattered between offices. The core concession files were 
generally kept at the main service centres, yet the monitoring files were sourced from various area 
offices. Financial records pre-2003 were also kept archived in an old finance system to which there is 
limited access. These approaches to data management made it very difficult to accurately undertake 
an assessment of compliance.  
Lack of communication is another factor observed to be inhibiting compliance. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that compliance with administrative conditions, such as compensation payments, might 
have been inhibited due to a lack of intra-departmental communication. Two compensation 
payments, for example, failed to get paid as a result of Permissions officers not communicating with 
finance staff. As a result of this, concession contracts were signed but invoices for the compensation 
payments were never sent out.  
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DOC’s tolerance for less than full compliance might be another impeding factor. Winter (1985) states 
that regulatory agencies may choose to under-exploit their authority if the regulated parties agree to 
act as requested. In this way the regulatory agency gains some level of compliance and avoids time-
consuming and costly enforcement procedures. The regulated entity, on the other hand, will avoid an 
embarrassing struggle against the law and may be able to barter with the agency in order to achieve 
less than full compliance (Winter, 1985); Winter (1985) notes that the legal powers given to 
regulatory agencies, such as DOC, are frequently used as bargaining chips in this way. Lack of 
resourcing might be another reason why DOC might under exploit their authority (Friesen, 2003; 
Scholz, 1984). Scholz (1984) explains that, by being more flexible with regards to acceptable levels of 
compliance, regulatory agencies can spread their limited resources much further (Scholz, 1984). An 
example of where this was witnessed was in regards to some of the weed and/or pest control 
conditions that formed part of this study. In some cases, DOC stated that concessionaires were in full 
compliance (albeit the last inspection often being several years ago) yet a site visit revealed that this 
was not so. Lack of resourcing cannot always be an excuse for low compliance as in some cases, 
concession contracts actually mentioned that DOC time towards monitoring was cost recoverable. 
This does not extend, however, to the cost of enforcement. Interestingly, game theory suggests that 
regulatory agencies are actually better off sacrificing legal requirements for full enforcement, as in 
this way they will more certainly achieve some level of compliance (Scholz, 1984; Winter, 1985). 
Lack of resourcing and the cost of enforcement are further expanded on by Friesen (2003), who 
states that a regulated entity will only comply with a regulation when its compliance cost is less than 
the expected penalty associated with violation. Frequent monitoring and strict enforcement 
strategies, including high fines, are traditionally proposed as solutions (Friesen, 2003; Wu, 2009). This 
can be difficult for a resource limited agency like DOC. As such, this might be another factor inhibiting 
compliance with concession conditions. Eckert (2004), Earnhart (2004) and Rousseau (2008) all 
confirmed the deterrent effect of increasing inspections. Friesen (2003), however, makes the point 
that, even with low inspection probabilities and small fines, compliance can still be high. This requires 
research into innovative, non-traditional approaches, approaches such as targeted enforcement 
(Friesen, 2003; Scholz, 1984), something DOC could research further.   
A final constraint, which might be impeding compliance and compliance monitoring of concession 
conditions, is the level of priority given to compliance monitoring and enforcement. The NZBS 
actively advocates the importance of monitoring: “Appropriate mechanisms to enforce policies and 
actions to conserve and sustainably use New Zealand’s biodiversity need to be developed and 
consistently used by relevant agencies; these might include education, surveillance, compliance 
monitoring, enforcement programmes and appropriate sanctions for non-compliance” (Anon, 2000, 
p. 90), however, DOC does not yet appear to have a compliance monitoring and enforcement 
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strategy. This might be something of importance for DOC to consider as there is in the literature a 
degree of dissatisfaction with DOC’s perceived failure to consistently enforce concession 
requirements (State Services Commission et al., 2010).  
5.2 Variations in Compliance 
This research looked at the heterogeneity of non-compliance as a way of identifying how current 
practices can be improved in order to enhance the overall outcomes of biodiversity compensation.  
Compliance was found to vary suggestively with one variable, condition type, and significantly with 
another variable, habitat type.  
A statistically significant relationship was found between habitat type and compliance (p = 0.034). 
Conditions relevant to Marine, Sub-Alpine Grassland, and Built-up Area LCDB4 habitat categories 
exhibited 100% compliance whilst conditions relevant to High Producing Exotic Grassland exhibited 
0% compliance. Unfortunately, no robust conclusions can be drawn from these figures as several of 
the habitat categories were represented by only single observations. Regardless, the literature 
suggests that compliance does vary with habitat type (Breaux et al., 2005; Quigley & Harper, 2006; 
Race & Fonseca, 1996). A study of wetland habitat types by Quigley and Harper (2006), for instance, 
found that compliance varied significantly from poorest for riparian habitats and highest for standing 
water habitats. Observations throughout this research show that habitat type links quite strongly 
with activity type, condition type and goal. It tends to be grazing concessions which occur on Low and 
High Producing Exotic Grassland habitat, and it tends to be non-administrative weed and/or pest 
control measures which are required as compensation. Further research using a larger sample size, 
might want to follow up on these linkages and on the effect of habitat type on compliance.  
A suggestive relationship was found between compliance and condition type (p = 0.056). Compliance 
was higher with administrative conditions than with non-administrative conditions. This finding 
reflects that of Brown (2014) who also found compliance to be higher with administrative conditions. 
This is thought to be a result of administrative conditions being less resource intensive to implement, 
monitor, and enforce. It is also related to the condition goal. For instance, all non-administrative 
conditions which were not complied with had a weed and/or pest control compensation goal. These 
were thought to be complied with less as a result of compliance being more difficult and time 
consuming to achieve. Weeds, for instance, had a tendency to prevail despite obvious effort by the 
concessionaire to remove them. Whilst other studies have honed in on the relationship between 
condition type and compliance (Bailey et al., 1992; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 
2006), none of these have focused on administrative versus non-administrative conditions.  
 68 
Based on the Fisher’s exact test, applicant type, activity type, and conservation land category had no 
significant effect on compliance. As explained in Section 3.5, however, the variations observed are 
still worth expanding on.   
Public organisations and companies were found to comply about 10% more than individuals and 
private organisations and companies. This matches observations made by Dasgupta et al. (2000) and 
by Brown (2014), who also found compliance rates to be higher for public organisations and 
companies. Dasgupta et al. (2000) explain that this might be due to the effect of public scrutiny. In 
their study they found that publically traded Mexican firms and larger firms were more likely to 
adopt policies which would improve their environmental performance than smaller, privately held 
firms. The findings of Hornyak and Halvorsen (2003) contradict this. They found that the county road 
agency in Michigan, US (a ‘public organisation’ with a significant degree of interaction with the 
regulator) was less likely to comply with requirements (44%) than permittees that were part of the 
general public (either ‘private companies’ or ‘private individuals’), whom had compliance levels of 
60%. Nevertheless, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between compliance and 
applicant type in this study contrasts with previous studies (Brown et al., 2013; Dasgupta et al., 2000; 
Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Shimshack, 2007).  
In terms of activity type, compliance rates were considerably lower with conditions related to grazing 
concessions (40%) as opposed to structural (88%) and telecommunications (86%) concessions. This 
lower rate of compliance with compensatory conditions from grazing concessions can be compared 
to the results of Brown (2014) who also found that, for ecological compensation conditions under the 
RMA, agricultural consent conditions were the least complied with. Compliance with agricultural 
consent conditions under the RMA, however, was only 4.8% whereas for grazing concession 
conditions under the Conservation Act it was 40%. Further research is required into reasons why 
such a difference exists. In terms of variations in this study, the lower rates of compliance with 
compensatory conditions from grazing concessions and access concessions seem to relate to their 
condition goals. For grazing concessions, the compensatory conditions all involved weed and/or pest 
control. This condition goal was earlier described as complex to implement, monitor and enforce. For 
access concessions, the two compensatory conditions which were not complied with at all involved 
compensation payments, and these were not paid due to a lack of intra-departmental 
communication (see Section 5.1).   
A trend was discovered in compliance with conservation land category. Compliance on category 1 
conservation land (most protected) was 100% and compliance on category 4 conservation land (least 
protected) was 40%. This trend in increasing compliance with increasing legal protection reflects the 
predictions of Neyer and Zurn (2001). The Fisher’s exact test, however, suggests that the trend is 
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statistically insignificant. An observation of note is that all grazing concessions assessed in this study 
are on category 4 conservation land. The reasons for which compliance was low with grazing 
concession compensatory conditions thus also apply to conditions relevant to category 4 
conservation land.  
5.3 Predictors of Compliance 
18 variables were hypothesised to predict expected rates of compliance. These variables were part of 
the concession process, the concession document itself and social circumstances surrounding the 
concession (see Section 3.4). Of these 18 variables, 14 were able to be assessed. The other four were 
left out of the analysis due to insufficient information. Of the 14, one variable significantly correlated 
with compliance. This variable was compensation duration. The data shows that one-off 
compensation conditions are more likely to be complied with than conditions which require ongoing 
intervention and maintenance. This may be because ongoing compensation conditions, such as weed 
and/or pest control, tend to be more complex and resource intensive to monitor and enforce. 
According to (Brown, 2014), one-off conditions were also significantly more likely to be complied 
with than ongoing conditions under the RMA.  
It is somewhat surprising that none of the other variables had any significant correlation with 
compliance. Having a professional ecologist involved, for instance, is often considered to benefit the 
design and implementation of any conservation measures, including compensation (Binning, 2000; 
Denny, 2011). However, this variable had no significant impact on compliance. This might be because 
the professional ecologist was not always retained throughout the implementation of the 
compensation measure. Observations do show that compliance was about 12% higher when a 
professional ecologist was involved. Considering the statistical limitations of the dataset this trend 
would be worth further investigation.   
Whether a concession was notified or not, also did not have a significant effect on compliance. This is 
despite compliance results being 28% higher for compensatory conditions from notified concessions 
versus non-notified. These results defy what was expected, which was that the increased public 
participation and scrutiny involved with notified concessions might lead to significantly higher rates 
of compliance. The observational trend in the data however matches what Brown (2014) found, 
except that for Brown (2014) the trend was statistically significant.  
The presence of a bond was expected to enhance compliance. This is because a bond acts as an 
insurance measure, where, to get the bond back, a concession holder has a vested interest in 
complying with the conditions of their concession. Compliance was observed to be 10% greater in 
the presence of a bond; however, this difference was calculated as statistically insignificant. Reasons 
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for why there was no significant relationship found between compliance and the presence of a bond 
might be because the bonds were either set too low or potentially the bonds themselves had not yet 
been paid. In this study the size of a compliance bond was relatively small, ranging from $1,000 to 
$100,000. The utilisation of bonds was also low. Only six concessions in this study included a 
requirement for a bond. Whilst bonds were not shown to significantly predict compliance, further 
research into improving the effectiveness of bonds is recommended as bonds present a simple form 
of insurance.  
The presence of monitoring requirements within a concession contract did not correlate significantly 
with compliance. This is despite widespread research which emphasises the importance of 
monitoring in improving compliance (Bekessy et al., 2010; Brownlie & Botha, 2009; Earnhart, 2004; 
Maron et al., 2012; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011; Shimshack, 2007; Tonkin and Taylor, 2012). The 
observations in this study actually show compliance to be lower in the presence of monitoring 
requirements. An explanation for this is that, a requirement for monitoring does not necessarily 
narrate the extent and effectiveness of the monitoring. For example, in many cases in this research, 
requirements for monitoring were not met. Section 5.1 expands further on how inconsistencies in 
monitoring might actually be inhibiting compliance.  
Compliance with biodiversity compensation conditions was observed to be 30% higher when 
concessionaires had other pending concession applications and/or renewals. This was expected as a 
consequence of concessionaires having a vested interest in regulatory goodwill. When cases received 
frequent visits from DOC staff compliance was also observed to be higher. Again, this was expected 
as frequent exposure to regulatory agents has been proven to increase the compliance of regulated 
entities (Friesen, 2003; Shimshack, 2007). In both cases, however, the Fisher’s exact test came up 
with a statistically insignificant result. This may be due to the statistical limitations of the dataset, or 
because there are other factors contributing to compliance, such as those observed and described in 
Section 5.1.  
A final variable worth expanding on is the timing of the compensation action. Biodiversity 
compensation is heavily critiqued for issues with time equivalency, with the timing of a 
compensation action seen as a critical determinant of success (Bekessy et al., 2010; Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 2012; Walker et al., 2009). The literature tends to support 
compensation actions which take place prior to a project taking place, as in this way the benefits of 
the compensatory action(s) are demonstrated in advance (Maron et al., 2012; McKenney & 
Kiesecker, 2010). In New Zealand, however, these advance mitigation programs are not supported 
under current policy frameworks (i.e. species banking and compensation credits). Brown (2014) 
found that, under the RMA the likelihood of compliance was significantly higher when compensatory 
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actions were required before or concurrent with the consented activity. In this study, no significant 
effect was found but compensatory actions required following the activity were observed to be 
complied with the most.  
5.4 Assumptions and Limitations 
A major challenge for this research has been the lack of explicit treatment of biodiversity 
compensation in law and policy in New Zealand. This was evident in DOC’s lack of knowledge around 
what biodiversity compensation is and how it has been applied on public conservation land under the 
Conservation Act. Without a clear definition and framework for how compensation measures are 
being considered and implemented under the Conservation Act, this study had to establish a 
definition as well as a broad approach to defining what is, or is not, compensation. These 
assumptions were justified through the data collection process, as concessions were not consistently 
documented or defined as including biodiversity compensation and no standard recording system 
exists in which concessions requiring compensatory actions are kept separately.  
A research design limitation is that the study focused only on case studies from the South Island of 
New Zealand and only on a sample of 28 conditions. This limitation is a result of time and budget 
constraints. Whilst it would be ideal to have a larger sample, particularly for statistical reasons, as 
well as to have a sample representative of the entire country, this proved neither realistic nor 
feasible. The assumption was that each concession case study would include several biodiversity 
compensation conditions and that, as these conditions form the actual sample size, this would create 
a sample large enough for effective statistical analysis. In the end, however, the study involved a 
total of only 28 relevant conditions. This sample size was large enough to assess the statistical 
significance of some variables, but limited when it came to variables with multiple categories (e.g. 
habitat type). The Fisher’s exact test was chosen over other statistical tests in order to deal with this 
limited sample size.  
The Fisher’s exact test comes with a number of assumptions and limitations. Section 3.5 explains 
these in detail and the extent to which they affect the dataset used in this study. Whilst the Fisher’s 
exact test was weighted as the best option for this study, its limitations, and the limitations of a small 
dataset must be kept in mind. As such, the statistical results of this study are indicative only and 
some emphasis has been shifted onto the qualitative observations instead. A future study, using the 
same dataset, would perhaps be better off undergoing a purely qualitative analysis.  
This study relied heavily on access to information. Case study files were provided by DOC and DOC 
staff were relied upon to provide additional information and knowledge. Assessments of compliance 
involved to a large degree a reliance on the information provided by DOC. This is a perceived 
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limitation as the study assumes that all the information provided is both complete and accurate. To 
counter this limitation, field assessments were undertaken where possible (for 11 of the 28 
conditions), allowing for result triangulation and therefore a more robust assessment of compliance. 
Interviews with concessionaires would have strengthened the robustness and depth of this study, 
however, they were not able to be carried out due to time constraints.  
A further limitation is in regards to sample representativeness. DOC’s concessions database holds 
several thousand concessions from all over the country. Whilst access was given to this database it 
was not possible to identify a sample of concessions in which each variable under investigation was 
equally represented. This was not only due to the number of variables under investigation but also 
due to the limitations of the concessions database. For instance, the database only has a narrow 
range of search options available and searching for biodiversity compensation was not one of these. 
Individual concession documents were also difficult and time consuming to search through as they 
were stored as image only pdf’s.  
In terms of the assessment of compliance, whilst considerable effort was made to ensure compliance 
scores were accurate and a reflection of multiple sources of information, compliance scores are to a 
degree subjective. For instance, the amount of blackberry and gorse present on an easement, where 
the concessionaire is obliged to remove all weeds, could qualify for any score along the compliance 
scale depending on the assessor’s leniency. The approach here was simply one that aimed for 
consistency.  
5.5 Summary 
The ratio of compliance to non-compliance found in this study, was similar to what was found by 
Brown (2014) for ecological compensation under the RMA. This means that compliance with 
compensatory requirements is comparable on public and private land in New Zealand. This was 
unexpected, as it was thought compliance on public land would be higher as a result of public 
scrutiny (Dasgupta et al., 2000) and the strict, conservation focused, provisions of the Conservation 
Act.  
In comparison to some overseas studies (Bailey et al., 1992; Harper & Quigley, 2005; Veneman & 
Brown, 2001), compliance was found to be a great deal higher in this study. Compliance was found to 
vary significantly with habitat type and suggestively with condition type. These outcomes reflect 
findings from the literature, confirming what was expected. The small sample size, however, has 
greatly limited statistical conclusions. As such, more emphasis has been placed on the observational 
trends. Compliance, for instance, was found to be considerably higher with conditions from 
structural concessions as opposed to from grazing concessions. This finding interlinks with the 
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variable “condition type”, as grazing concession condition types were all non-administrative, and 
these were complied with less than administrative conditions. It also interlinks with the low level of 
compliance for conservation land category 4, as all concessions relating to this land are grazing 
concessions. Furthermore, it interlinks with the Low and High Producing Exotic Grassland habitat 
types as this is typically where grazing occurs. Evidently, all variables are all interlinked and it is the 
qualitative observations which have proven most useful.  
Several trends were observed between compliance and variables which formed part of the 
concession process, the concession itself, and social circumstances surrounding the concession. 
These trends frequently matched what was expected from within the literature (Binning, 2000; 
Brown, 2014; Shimshack, 2007). Compliance, for instance, was higher in the presence of a bond, for 
notified concessions, and for concessions where the concessionaire had pending concession 
applications and/or renewals. Only one predictor variable, “compensation duration,” exhibited a 
statistically significant relationship with compliance. One-off conditions were more likely to be 
complied with then ongoing conditions. This was likely a result of ongoing conditions being more 
complex and resource intensive to monitor and enforce. Whilst this indicates where efforts should be 
focused in order to enhance compliance, it does not suggest that ongoing conditions should stop 
being utilised, as they might well be a more suitable form of compensation.  
Several other qualitative factors, which extended beyond the variables quantified, were noted during 
the research process as potential inhibitors of compliance. These include: an inconsistent approach 
to compliance monitoring and enforcement, an inconsistent approach to compliance reporting and 
data management, deficiencies in intra-department communication, tolerance, a lack of resourcing, 
and the level of priority compliance monitoring and enforcement is granted. These have all also been 
expressed within the literature as reasons for poor compliance (Matthews & Endress, 2008; Rega, 
2013; Tonkin and Taylor, 2012).  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Implications 
This research has provided the first insight into the use of, and compliance with, biodiversity 
compensation under the Conservation Act in New Zealand. Whilst there is no explicit policy guidance 
for the use of biodiversity compensation as a tool under the Conservation Act, this study has found 
that compensation measures are being considered and implemented, mostly on a case-by-case basis.  
The results of this study show that approximately two-thirds of biodiversity compensation conditions 
are complied with. This rate of compliance is similar to the rate of compliance with ecological 
compensation conditions under the RMA (Brown, 2014), and a considerable improvement on various 
overseas studies (Bailey et al., 1992; Harper & Quigley, 2005; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Veneman 
& Brown, 2001).  
The literature suggests that rates of compliance vary across different condition types, activity types, 
applicant types, habitat types, and conservation land category types (Brown et al., 2013; Matthews & 
Endress, 2008; Neyer & Zurn, 2001; Quigley & Harper, 2006; Shimshack, 2007). This study used a 
mixture of spatial, archival, and field ecology methods, as well as the Fisher’s exact test, to determine 
if this was the case for compensatory conditions under the Conservation Act. Whilst the statistical 
results of this study did not reveal significant variations, observation trends in the data did. These 
observations have been granted more weight as a consequence of the limited size and statistical 
relevance of the dataset. An analysis of the effect of variables within the concession process, the 
concession document, and social circumstances surrounding the concession, also resulted in some 
interesting variations in compliance. Compliance, for instance, was significantly influenced by the 
duration of the compensatory action. These findings provide regulatory agencies with a deeper 
understanding of the nature of compliance, and how instances of non-compliance could be 
addressed. In addition to these findings, several institutional factors were observed to be inhibiting 
compliance. These factors include inconsistencies in compliance monitoring and reporting and the 
low level of priority afforded to compliance monitoring. The presence of these factors correlates with 
international findings (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; Tonkin and 
Taylor, 2012) and emphasises the need for a stronger approach.  
The ultimate question this research poses is whether two-thirds compliance with biodiversity 
compensation concession conditions on New Zealand’s conservation estate is good enough. Non-
compliance, or “broken promises,” result in uncertain biodiversity outcomes. These are often at the 
expense of net losses in biodiversity as a result of the concession activity for which permission was 
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granted. The intended “win-win,” where both concessionaires and biodiversity benefit (Kiesecker et 
al., 2010; Ten Kate et al., 2004), turns into a win-lose, where biodiversity ultimately loses.  
Throughout this research the focus has been on compliance with biodiversity compensation 
conditions. However, out of the concessions searched, only around 15% included compensatory 
conditions. There are many concessions where an argument could be made for the inclusion of such 
measures. For those concessions which had a large ecological footprint, but did not utilise 
compensation measures, losses to biodiversity are less forgivable. Consequently, this study 
recommends the formalisation of biodiversity compensation under the Conservation Act, and a 
review of how it is, and can be, appropriately utilised.  
6.1 Formalising Biodiversity Compensation 
This research has struggled with the lack of explicit treatment of biodiversity compensation within 
law and policy in New Zealand. Biodiversity compensation measures are increasingly being 
considered as part of concession applications (Salmon, 2013), yet they are not being implemented 
and evaluated in a robust, consistent manner. Biodiversity compensation has the potential to 
contribute significantly towards biodiversity conservation and enhancement, yet the ad hoc use of 
biodiversity compensation appears to be constraining its potential. Formalising biodiversity 
compensation would have the effect of strengthening controls on its use and ensuring all forms of 
compensation are implemented robustly. It would also greatly enhance the capacity for compliance 
and outcome monitoring. Furthermore, the formalisation process would further present an 
opportunity to outline measurable goals for the use of compensatory measures (Bekessy et al., 2010; 
Memon et al., 2004) as well as evaluative tools for ensuring their ecological success. 
Whilst some policy development within this area is occurring (Department of Conservation, 2014b; 
Ministry for the Environment, 2011), the focus has always been on biodiversity offsets, which are just 
one form of compensation. In order for biodiversity conservation goals to really be advanced through 
compensation, the stricter goals of offsetting (e.g. no net loss) should be legislated for, and applied 
to all occurrences of biodiversity compensation. To support the appropriate use of biodiversity 
compensation this research thus suggests:  
- A formalised approach, including clear goals and guidelines, for the use of biodiversity 
compensation under the Conservation Act; 
- Wider consideration of compensatory measures as a way of recompensing the residual, 
unavoidable impacts of concession activities and of negating the cumulative impacts of 
development and resource use on publically owned land and biodiversity; 
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- Staff training for DOC and DOC contractors in the appropriate use of, and monitoring of, 
biodiversity compensation measures. 
6.2 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement 
This research found that compliance with biodiversity compensation requirements is monitored and 
enforced inconsistently. The responsibility for monitoring fell on numerous parties, and it was often 
not clear who was responsible or whether any monitoring had been carried out at all. The level of 
monitoring also varied markedly. Whilst DOC is known to carry out extensive monitoring of specific 
programmes and projects (State Services Commission et al., 2010), systematic compliance 
monitoring seems to be of low priority.  
Rigorous monitoring and enforcement is the only way to ensure that the residual effects of a 
concession activity on biodiversity have been adequately compensated for (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et 
al., 2013). This would be possible with a clear monitoring and enforcement strategy, something 
which DOC does not yet appear to have. Whilst this study has looked at compliance with biodiversity 
compensation requirements, a more thorough, nation-wide investigation into compliance monitoring 
and enforcement is suggested. Such a study would provide the opportunity for learning and adaptive 
management. Based on findings from this research and relevant literature (Matthews & Endress, 
2008; Rega, 2013; Tonkin and Taylor, 2012), the following recommendations are put forward:  
- A coordinated and systematic compliance monitoring and enforcement strategy; 
- Guidelines for implementing the above; 
- Training in the field of biodiversity compensation compliance and outcome monitoring; 
- Prioritisation of monitoring and enforcement under the Conservation Act; and 
- Resources and funds directed at compliance monitoring and enforcement; alternatively, 
research into creative solutions aimed at maximising compliance within limited resources 
(see Section 5.1). 
6.3 Compliance Reporting 
During the course of this study, inconsistencies in compliance reporting and data management were 
observed. Records of compliance were found to differ widely in their detail; some entailed 
comprehensive site inspection reports and others a single sentence in an email. In several cases 
there was no record at all of any compliance monitoring. The system for data management also left 
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room for improvement. It is possible that this system might already be undergoing improvement, 
however, with thousands of concessions nationwide progress would no doubt be slow.  
With regards to the RMA, a nationwide monitoring and reporting system has recently been 
established (Ministry for the Environment, 2015). Prior to this, compliance monitoring was reported 
on via a biannual RMA survey of local authorities (Ministry for the Environment, 2015). Whilst this 
reporting system does not specifically record compliance with compensatory conditions, no similar 
reporting system exists at all for the Conservation Act. The creation of such a reporting system would 
inform the public about what is happening on the public conservation estate and whether 
concessionaires are meeting requirements laid out under the Conservation Act and any other 
relevant legislation. Ideally such a reporting system would include a section on compliance with 
compensatory conditions, to enable DOC and the public to assess whether appropriate exchanges 
are being made. Observations from this research support the following recommendations:  
- Research into a nationwide reporting system or survey of compliance under the 
Conservation Act; and 
- A consistent approach to compliance reporting and data management. 
- A recording mechanism for concessions which include biodiversity compensation. 
6.4 Further Research 
This research was only able to look at a small sample of biodiversity compensation conditions and 
these were limited to active concessions of particular activity types on New Zealand’s South Island. 
These limitations have constrained the findings of this research. The implication of this is that there is 
still room for a broader nation-wide study, and/or a study which involves a larger sample size of 
compensatory conditions. Several variables, which were investigated during the course of this 
research and which had a statistically insignificant yet observable correlation with compliance, would 
benefit from such further analysis.  
This research has paralleled Part 1 of the research undertaken by Brown (2014). To facilitate an even 
greater cross-policy comparison Part 2 and 3 of Brown (2014), which looked at the implementation 
of, and stakeholder perspectives on, ecological compensation under the RMA, should also be 
repeated under the Conservation Act.  Such a comparison would highlight what social, cultural, and 
institutional dynamics lead to better biodiversity outcomes and improved compliance.  
This research has focused on compliance with biodiversity compensation measures, however, 
compliance is not necessarily the same thing as ecological success (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; 
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Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quintero & Mathur, 2011). The focus on “compliance” in this study was 
because compliance is much easier to measure. Measuring the outcome of a biodiversity 
compensation measure (whether the measure sufficiently compensated for the losses to 
biodiversity) is much more complex (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). Research on this topic, 
however, is essential. Such research would establish the extent to which biodiversity compensation 
measures actually benefit biodiversity and whether appropriate exchanges are occurring (Breaux et 
al., 2005; Brown, 2014).  
In addition, more research is required on the appropriate design of biodiversity compensation and 
offset measures. The concept is still riddled with complications which are undermining its use as a 
tool to prevent biodiversity decline. Social drivers, for instance, which cause compensation measures 
to be unfair for biodiversity require detailed investigation. In New Zealand, more research is also 
required into understanding what “no-net-loss” actually means at a site and landscape scale against 
regional and national biodiversity protection objectives. Research into accounting for time-lags 
between biodiversity losses and gains, into comparing projects with different time profiles (e.g. short 
term pest control as compensation for the loss of virgin forest), and into the appropriate use of out-
of-kind offsets and compensation measures is also required. In terms of application, no research has 
yet been done looking into the use of biodiversity compensation under the Crown Minerals Act. The 
use of biodiversity compensation measures in the marine environment has also never been 
evaluated.  
There is a plethora of research which could follow on from this study. The ideas mentioned here do 
not represent an exhaustive list. Whilst this research has provided new insight, it has also 
demonstrated that significant improvements are required if biodiversity compensation is to help 
mitigate the biodiversity crisis unfolding in New Zealand today.  
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Appendix A 
Field Assessment Sheet 
Field visit – Compliance Assessment 
 
Concession number: Site address:  
Condition number(s):  
Date: 
Time: 
GPS/ map reference:  
 
 
Concessionaire supervision? Y N 
Concessionaire contact details:  
 
 
Activity type: Habitat Type: 
 
Visitations by general public:  Low Medium High 
Activity description: 
 
 
 
Site description: 
 
 
 
 
Compliance scale Description 
0 – No compliance 
 
No level of compliance apparent with the stated 
condition 
 
1 – Low level of compliance 
 
Minor or insignificant achievement of compliance 
 
2 – Medium level of compliance 
 
Significant level of compliance with the stated 
condition, but falls short of full compliance 
 
3 – Satisfactory compliance 
 
Acceptable compliance that is within a practical 
margin of error and minor flexibility 
 
 
Condition number:  Condition text:  
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 Compliance score: Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition number:  Condition text:  
 
 
 
 
Compliance score: Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition number:  Condition text:  
 
 
 
 
Compliance score: Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition number:  Condition text:  
 
 
 
 
Compliance score: Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition number:  Condition text:  
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Compliance score: Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition number:  Condition text:  
 
 
 
 
Compliance score: Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition number:  Condition text:  
 
 
 
 
Compliance score: Notes: 
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